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ABSTRACT 
 
Although several studies have investigated on commercial farmers’ risk preferences, 
there is still lack of information on the risk attitudes and risk preferences of 
smallholder farmers in South Africa. Risks associated with the adoption of new 
agricultural technology need to be explored in order to address the transition from 
homestead food gardening to smallholder irrigated farming. This study seeks to 
understand risk perception of smallholder irrigation farmers by linking constraints to 
commercialisation, adoption of new agricultural technologies and risk preferences of 
smallholder farmers in the former Ciskei Homelands of the Eastern Cape.  
 
A total of 101 respondents were surveyed, consisting of 38 smallholder farmers and 
63 homestead food gardeners in the Eastern Cape. Questionnaires were used to 
record household activities, socio-economic and institutional data as well as 
household demographics through personal interviews. The probit results indicated 
that older farmers are less risk averse thus more willing to take risk. The risk analysis 
indicates that farmers who are employed elsewhere are more willing to take risk as 
income is playing a major role in risk preferences. The results also prove that factors 
such as tenure system and years in farming have a major influence on farmers’ 
decision to take risk and adopt new agricultural technology. 
 
According to the multi-logit model the major factors influencing technology adoption 
and risk taking are household size, water rate and type of irrigation system used by 
the farmers. This study provides useful practical insights for policy makers, farm 
advisers and researchers in the design of effective and efficient policies, 
programmes and projects which can affect the adoption of technology, increase 
smallholder farmers capacity to manage risk and drive growth in the food market.  
 
Keywords: Risk preferences, agricultural technology adoption, probit, multinomial logit, 
irrigation, smallholder farmers 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Agricultural production in low income developing countries is generally poorly 
diversified; focusing on rain fed staple crop production and raising livestock activities 
that are inherently risky. The significance of agriculture in the economies of 
developing countries has long been recognized. In Africa, the agricultural sector 
plays a significant role in terms of its contributions to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), income and employment (Nkanleu, Gokowski and Kazianga, 2003). More 
than 80% of the population in some countries in Africa are dependent on small-scale 
farming as their primary source of livelihood. Agriculture contributes to industrial 
growth through endowment of cheap labour, capital for investment, foreign exchange 
earnings, and markets for manufactured consumer goods, enhanced rural incomes 
to support increasing numbers dependent on the industry, as well as food and raw 
material needs for the fast growth in urban populations (Kydd, Dorward, Morrison 
and Cadisch, 2001). 
 
According to Van Rooyen (1997), agriculture contributes both directly and indirectly 
to economic growth. The direct contribution is reflected by the relative small 
proportion of GDP and employment. However, the indirect contribution through 
agriculture’s linkages and multipliers is large. One of the most fundamental roles of 
agriculture is supplying food to the consumer at an affordable price. Agricultural 
production in South Africa has increased on average at a rate of 3.4% annually since 
the 1980’s, while the population has increased at an average rate of 2.6% (FAO, 
2010).  
 
In South Africa the term smallholder irrigation is mostly used when referring to 
irrigated agriculture practiced by black people.  South Africa has about 1.3 million ha 
under irrigation, of which 0.1 million ha is in the hands of smallholders (Backeberg, 
2006).  Smallholder irrigators have been categorized into the following four groups, 
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namely, (i) farmers on irrigation schemes; (ii) independent irrigation farmers; (iii) 
community gardeners; and (iv) home gardeners (De Lange, 1994; Crosby, et al., 
2000; Du Plessis, Van Averbeke and Van der Stoep, 2002).  Backeberg (2006) 
estimated the number of South African smallholder irrigators to range between 200 
000 and 250 000, but majority of these were farming very small plots, mainly to 
provide food for home consumption. South African smallholder irrigation schemes 
are multi-farmer irrigation projects larger than 5 ha in size that were either 
established in the former homelands or in resource-poor areas by black people or 
agencies assisting their development.   
 
Smallholders farmers in most developing countries are somewhat land constrained, 
poorly linked to markets, and are more vulnerable to risk than larger farmers in the 
same area. Therefore, the logical starting point for identifying priority policy 
interventions that target smallholder farmers in a certain area would be recognizing 
important differences within and across that areas small- farm sector. 
 
Risk is an issue of critical importance to smallholder farmer’s decision making and it 
complexes their livelihoods (Belaineh, 2000 and 2002, Belaineh and Drake, 2002). 
For the farmers the main issue raised by inconsistency of climate, price and other 
risk factors is how to respond and adapt systematically, contextually and 
enthusiastically to unfolding risks to reduce the possibility of losses and its downside 
consequences.  Studies in experimental economics have tried to examine to what 
degree risk attitudes lead to impacts on economic performance. They find that the 
risk aversion has been inversely linked with economic outcome such as investment 
in physical, human capital and wage growth (Shwa, 1996).  
 
However, most economic analysis assumes the preferences of individual farmers are 
taken as given and those preferences decide the farmer’s selection. Based on this 
assumption, society’s economic behavior is obtained by aggregating the choices in 
the society. This way leaves little room for investigating how the environment in 
which farmers make decisions affects those decisions (Postlewaite, 2011). 
 
Other studies, however, suggest that individual experiences can have long term 
effects on preferences that can affect long term individuals’ risk attitudes. In their 
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study Malmendier and Nagel (2011), find that personal traumatic experiences such 
as the combat experiences of veterans have long term effects on financial decisions. 
Particularly their findings show that having experienced psychological shocks 
decrease an individual’s willingness to take financial risks. 
 
Information acquisition and learning would influence inactivity to cope with various 
sources of risks (Noell and Odening, 1997). Risk information that is traditional early 
warming techniques and those channels from government sources, the way it is 
communicated, reliability of the information and the eventual learning assumes 
importance to pilot in a complex and uncertain world. Noell and Odening (1997) 
further suggest that information collection and processing is, among other things, a 
significant risk management behavior over time.  Adesina and Quattara (2000) argue 
that unless policy makers improve the accessibility of information that allows farmers 
to progress their managerial capacity for making more risk- efficient cropping 
decisions, it is unlikely that farmers will be able to cope with persistent risks that 
affect their welfare and livelihoods. Partially as provision of information to farmers 
could enable them to make more informed decisions- whilst attributing 
communication of technical information to farmers’ sources alone is arguable, as 
there are various informal source of wisdom and information with varying contents 
and magnitude in the rural context. 
 
The risk environment of farmers markets is changing, among others due to 
increasing market liberation and industrialization of agriculture (Boehlje and Lins, 
1998). These changes lead to new risks management instruments are being 
developed. Risk management strategies adopted by farm managers will be in 
accordance with their personal preferences for risk. In this context it would be useful 
for developers and sellers of such new risk strategies to have insight into these 
preferences of farmers (Beal, 1996). 
 
Risk preferences play an important role in economics. Studies in experimental 
economics have tried to examine to what degree risk attitudes lead to impacts on 
economic performance. They find that the risk aversion has been inversely linked 
with economic outcome such as investment in physical, human capital and wage 
growth (Shwa, 1996). However, most economic analysis assumes the preferences of 
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individual farmers are taken as given and those preferences decide the farmer’s 
selection. Based on this assumption, society’s economic behavior is obtained by 
aggregating the choices in the society. This way leaves little room for investigating 
how the environment in which farmers make decisions affects those decisions 
(Postlewaite, 2011). 
 
 There are clear opportunities for commercialization of smallholder farming in Africa 
but the challenge lies in bringing markets to farmers – ‘pulling’ demand for goods 
that will encourage farmers to make investments, find innovative ways of overcoming 
spatial and technological constraints (Livingston, Schonberger and Delaney, 2002). 
Despite phenomenal success of the commercial sector in South Africa and 
significant progress in integrating smallholders since democratic reforms, food 
security concerns remain in South Africa. Recent global increases in food have 
further aggravated vulnerabilities and make it imperative to examine alternative food 
production questions in the country.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
There are many obstacles to the growth of smallholder agriculture. One of the 
obstacles is the persistence to out dated production technologies because farmers 
do not adapt to technologies whose benefits are do not well demonstrated and they 
do not see any incentives to adoption to improved practices. 
Smallholder farmers involved in agricultural production in developing countries come 
across a number of risks, including crop yield risks due to discrepancies in rainfall 
and fluctuating output prices. Farmers’ decisions to decline welfare improving 
opportunities because of perceptions of risk have significant policy implications. 
While the existence of agricultural risk and its effects on developing countries is well 
known, there are few empirical estimations of the magnitude and nature of 
household risk aversion in this context. Moreover, there is petite information on the 
basic household factors behavior affecting risk behavior. With developing countries, 
there may be vital linkages between risk aversion on the part of the farm households 
and seemingly distinct elements such as household fertility, educational attainment, 
and gender dynamics. Working on these elements can expand outcomes for 
technology adoption (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2007). 
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 According to Eswaran and Kotwal (2002), for a given risk aversion, under- 
investment in risky production activities will be greater for households who are 
constrained in their consumption smoothing activities. Whilst it is the role of 
constraints that is ultimately of concern and of policy interest (Zimmerman and 
Carter, 2003), the dependence on measures of wealth to identify the impact of risk 
on many contexts is challenging as it is not fully possible to deal with the 
endogeneity issues entailed in identifying the fundamental relationship between a 
measure of wealth and production decisions. An unobserved preference for risk will 
affect not only current production choices, but also past production choices and thus 
the asset- wealth of a household, causing a household’s ability to deal with the risk 
to be endogenous to production choices. Only if an innate measure of risk 
preferences is also included can endogeneity problem be solved. 
 
From a social learning theory perspective, Tucker and Napier (2001), the increased 
emphasis on formal information sources will yield higher levels of perceived risk. 
(Although, interpersonal sources such as friends and neighbours, should also play a 
substantial role in risk perception by dispensing information from formal and other 
sources more widely throughout the agricultural community. Relatively, Tucker and 
Napier (2001) argue that informal sources may also have access to information 
about specific local issues that formal sources do not. Therefore, increased 
communication with and/or with-in various farmers' groups are likely to be associated 
with risk perceptions and selection of risk management tools. To add on, Belaineh 
and Drake (2002) and Belaineh (2002) claim that smallholder farmers in Eastern 
Ethiopia perceive risk subjectively, that is, at individual and group levels, and 
respond accordingly. Perception of risk is subjective in a sense that it is vulnerable to 
variations depending on the past contextual experiential learning, provision of and/or 
access to information, confidence in institutions and bases of information, farm and 
farmer's characteristics, interaction and status in the community and psychological 
mindset of the individual farmers and the groups. 
Studies reveal that households’ response towards risk is due to a number of factors 
when faced with new agricultural technologies. Some of these factors are relative to 
the nature of the transformation in agricultural production, whereas others are 
relative to farmers past experiences and characteristics. This indicates that farmers 
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are more sensitive to loss than gains. According to Yesuf and Bluffstone (2007) 
smallholders who stand to lose as well as gain more than their loss are significantly 
risk averse than those that face potential gains only. Therefore, there is a need for 
agricultural extension intervention involving losses and gains may face systematic 
resistance by farmers in low income and high risk environments. Once initial 
successes convince farmers that technology is viable, risk aversion declines. 
Therefore, smallholder farmers base their investment and production decisions, 
partially tend to be unwilling to adopt new agricultural technologies even when 
expected net returns are high. As such a better understanding of risk behavior is 
necessary for identifying appropriate farm- level strategies for adoption of new 
technology by small holder farmer (Yesuf and Bluffstone; 2007). 
There is already some experiential evidence that hypothetical questions on risk 
correlate as expected with risk taking behavior (Knight, Weir and Woldehanna, 
2003). These studies determine whether there is a correlation between risk 
preferences and behavior, but the focus is not to present an empirical model of risk- 
taking behavior under uncertainty. In particular, a household’s ability to deal with risk 
is not controlled by a household’s perception of risk in a given activity (Dercon, 
1996). It focuses on risk preferences and risk perceptions to determine whether they 
influence individual behavior as a model of labour allocation under risk would, predict 
in particular recognizing that the ability of a household to deal with risk is crucially 
important in determining how preferences affect behavior. 
South African studies where farm- level data sets were used to identify the 
importance of multiple risk sources include that of Hardman, Darroch, and Ortman 
(2002) and Stockil and Ortman (1997). In this studies it was found that factor 
analysis suggested that crop gross income, government policy, livestock gross 
income, credit access, government regulation and costs were described as risk 
sources. Stockil and Ortman analyzed the importance and dimensions of risk 
sources and the respondents, identified changes in the cost of farm inputs, 
government legislation, rand exchange rate and product prices as the most important 
sources of risk. Factor analysis of risk sources showed that various dimensions to 
risk exist including changes in government policy, enterprise gross income, credit 
access and cost changes. 
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Bullock, Ortman and Levin (1994) identified price, climate and yield variability as the 
most important sources of risk in vegetable production. The results also showed that 
government policies added to the level of uncertainty faced by vegetable farmers. 
However, a comparative analysis among large and small vegetable farmers 
portrayed differences in their perceptions of risk. Small farmers perceived changes in 
credit availability and changes in input costs to be more important risk sources than 
large farmers. In their studies Swanepoel and Ortman (1993) revealed that sources 
of and responses to risk in farm production, marketing and financing were 
considered to be variations in livestock production, rainfall and livestock prices, the 
threat of land reform, and changes in input costs. 
Smallholder irrigation farmers are characterized by significant business risk and 
there is evidence that poor smallholder farmers are typically risk averse (Binswanger 
and Sillers, 1983). Although studies have investigated commercial farmers’s risk 
preferences, there is lack of information on the risk attitudes of smallholder farmers 
in South Africa. This study seeks to understand risk perception of smallholder 
irrigation farmers by linking constraints to commercialisation, adoption of new 
agricultural technologies and risk preferences of smallholder farmers in the former 
Ciskei Homelands of the Eastern Cape. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
The main objective of this research is to determine risk preference patterns and 
attitudes that influence the transition from homestead food gardening to irrigate 
farming of smallholder farming systems in the former Ciskei Homelands of the 
Eastern Cape. The study will more specifically: 
 Understand farming systems by these farmers  
 Analyse the adoption of new  agricultural technology smallholder irrigation 
farmers 
 Assess the risk perception of smallholder irrigation farmers 
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1.4 Research questions 
 
This study is guided by the main research question: what influence does risk 
preference attitudes and patterns have on the transition of homestead food 
gardeners to smallholder irrigation farming? This question is further guided by the 
following sub questions: 
 
 Which farming systems do smallholder farmers use? 
 What are the constraints of homestead food gardeners to irrigated smallholder 
farming? 
 How do smallholder farmers adopt to new agricultural technology? 
 What are the perceptions of small irrigation farmers on risk? 
 
1.5 Hypotheses  
 
The hypotheses to be tested in this study are: 
 Farmers use the same farming system 
 Small holder farmers are late adopters of new agricultural technology 
 Smallholder farmers are more risk averse 
 
1.6 Justification of the study 
 
Unemployment is high and tends to rise as households lose jobs in the urban 
centres. Farmers in these areas are not really part of commercial agriculture. This is 
one of the reasons that the contribution of smallholder agriculture to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) is still limited in South Africa. The majority of disadvantaged 
farmers are not part of mainstream agriculture and practices smallholder agriculture 
in the former homelands. This kind of smallholder farming is characterized by low 
production and poor productivity, poor access to land and poor access to inputs and 
credit. In order to generate enough income, farmers engage themselves in off- farm 
or non- farm income generating activities. 
 
It is, however, possible for smallholder farming to survive economically when given a 
set of opportunities. Smallholder farmers are used to take rational decisions in order 
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to adapt to conditions they find themselves in. for example, given a set of resources, 
farmers will strive to optimize production. Another particular and critical set of 
opportunities involves opening access for smallholders to interact with other 
economic agents. 
 
To some extend the process of agricultural transformation in South Africa involves 
moving households from smallholder production to producing for the market or 
commercializing. Commercializing has a number of benefits and advantages. In 
particular employment is promoted and income generated (Ngqangweni, 2000). The 
commercial environment provides a potential for increased production and thus for 
improving food security for the rural poor. Studies by Ngqangweni (2000); Delgado, 
Rosegrant, Steinfeld, Ehui and Courbois, (1999) have shown positive and strong 
multiplier effects of investing in agriculture. Therefore, agriculture has an important 
role to play in fostering rural development and poverty alleviation. It is through 
commercialization of smallholder agriculture that the previously disadvantaged 
groups can become a significant part of the economic base of rural economies. It is 
respected that efforts to promote structural change, such as land  reform, improved 
access to credit and a number of markets have benefited some, although a small 
minority of black farmers. But the reforms have not been sufficient to improve the 
participation in commercial agriculture of the majority of smallholder and emerging 
farmers. 
 
There is risk aversion of smallholders to commercialize. Therefore research is 
needed to identify policy options that will stimulate the transition of smallholder 
farmers to become commercial operators. This study aims to propose ways to 
alleviate constraints to commercialization by smallholder farmers. According to 
Binswanger (1982), poor smallholder farmers are risk averse and their production 
and economic environments are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. 
Owing to their wealth smallholder farmers are also expected to be relatively 
vulnerable to risk and consequently, risk is expected to be an important determinant 
of their decisions. These general conclusions and observations have stimulated 
extensive research into the effects of risk on smallholder farmers’ adaptation. The 
case of rural poor households whose capacity to bear risk is low, tend to exhibit a 
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risk averse behavior. Income or production shocks could thus have a drastic impact 
on the households. 
An insight into the sources of risk has a clear implication as to how riskiness of 
adoption of technology may be reduced, thus increasing the likelihood that relatively 
more risk averse farmers will adopt to new agricultural technology. Knowledge of 
farmers, risk preferences could help in the design of technological and institutional 
practices tailored to their economic behavior in order to improve the likelihood that 
rural development programmes will succeed in improving household incomes. The 
findings of the study will guide on how the government and/or the private sector can 
develop policies that help farmers reduce and/or manage risk and tailor literacy and 
risk management education and strategies towards the various farmer groups in 
South Africa. 
 
1.7 Chapter summary 
 
Chapter 1 presents the introduction of the study which gives an overview of 
agriculture in developing countries. The chapter proceeds by introducing the concept 
of risk and its effect on small holder farmers. The problem statement is thoroughly 
explained. It also goes on to explain the objectives and research questions. The 
chapter is concluded by the justification of the study. 
Chapter 2 is the review literature which covers a wide range of issues. It begins by 
defining smallholder farmers and how the term is used in the South African context. 
It further explains risks and its effects on agriculture and the types of risk thereof. It 
proceeds with the adoption of technology and the theories of technology adoption. It 
further it continues with the concept of technology adoption by addressing the factors 
that affect the adoption of technology. The concept of commercialisation is defined, 
the constraints to commercialise, and the role that risk play in commercialisation is 
also tackled. The chapter concludes by identifying the sources of risk and the risk 
management strategies thereof. 
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Chapter 3 provides the utility theory, thereby explaining the expected utility theory 
and measure of risk aversion is discussed and the justification presented for the use 
of the Arrow Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion to measure decision makers risk aversion. 
The Chapter concludes with the various methods for measuring risk attitudes for 
agricultural producers. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology, introducing the study area. Data collection 
methods and instruments are presented. The variables are specified in this section 
as is the background on the empirical data analysis models used in the study. 
Chapter 5 provides the results and discussion 
Chapter 6 is the summary, conclusion, recommendations and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter introduces the concept of risk and its effect on agriculture. The chapter 
proceeds to review literature on the adoption of new agricultural technology by 
smallholder farmers thus reviewing the different theories and the factors affecting the 
agricultural technology adoption. It further presents the concept of commercialization 
and the constraints of smallholder farmers to commercialise. The chapter then links 
the role of risk with commercialisation by smallholder farmers. It continues by 
introducing the sources of risk and risk management strategies and the chapter 
concludes by reviewing literature on the South African studies on risk preferences. 
 
 
2.2 Defining South Africa’s smallholder farmers  
 
In South Africa the term smallholder irrigation is mostly used when referring to 
irrigated agriculture practiced by black people (Backeberg, 2006).  South Africa has 
about 1.3 million ha under irrigation, of which 0.1 million ha is in the hands of 
smallholders (Backeberg, 2006).  Smallholder irrigators have been categorized into 
the following four groups, namely, (i) farmers on irrigation schemes; (ii) independent 
irrigation farmers; (iii) community gardeners; and (iv) home gardeners (De Lange, 
1994; Crosby et al., 2000; Du Plessis et al., 2002).  Backeberg (2006) estimated the 
number of South African smallholder irrigators to range between 200 000 and 250 
000, but majority of these were farming very small plots, mainly to provide food for 
home consumption. South African smallholder irrigation schemes are multi-farmer 
irrigation projects larger than 5 ha in size that were either established in the former 
homelands or in resource-poor areas by black people or agencies assisting their 
development.   
 
Ortmann and King (2010) describe them as farmers with limited access to factors of 
production, credit, information, markets and are often constrained by inadequate 
property rights and high transaction costs, and the household labour use is dominant 
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on the farms. Smallholders farmers in South Africa demand larger holdings and are 
relatively more market oriented in comparison to homestead food plots, and 
sometimes are referred to “emerging farmers”. These "emerging farmers" are 
associated with the land reform programme and are basically black smallholders 
who are expected to produce more for the market but are probably not doing so (Van 
Averbeke et al., 2011).  
 
According to Aliber et al. (2009), geographically, smallholder farmers in South Africa 
are unevenly distributed. Aliber et al. (2009) understood a broad definition of 
agricultural smallholders in South Africa, including farmers who function 
independently, farm in groups, subsistence farmers, and the market orientated 
whose purpose is mainly commercial. Thus, there are two categories of smallholders 
that can be identified using this broader definition, those whose farming is mainly 
subsistence and the commercially oriented smallholders. In total, there are about 4 
million smallholder individuals who participate in South Africa‘s agricultural sector 
and of the 4 million, about 92% are engaged in farming mainly for home 
consumption and only 8% of these farmers mainly produce for household income 
(Aliber et al., 2009). This statistics provided by Labour Force Survey (LFS) of 
Statistics South Africa categories smallholders in terms of their major purpose of 
farming (Aliber et al., 2009). Statistically this may be used as a proxy to differentiate 
between the subsistence smallholders and commercial smallholders. 
  
The 92% of subsistence smallholders indicated that they purposely farm to ensure 
household food security vis-à-vis accumulation of wealth. Although subsistence-
smallholders contribute less to the national agricultural market share and the national 
economic growth at large, their role in mitigating hunger cannot be ignored (Aliber et 
al., 2009). This can be best explained by the high public expenditure incurred by the 
government to establish irrigation schemes and provided food parcels to needy 
households during the 1930s and the early 2000s hunger experiences in South 
Africa. Therefore, efforts to enhance subsistence production, is necessary.  
 
In 2007, during the Polokwane conference, the African National Congress (ANC) 
government called for land reform and agrarian change as one way of supporting 
subsistence food production, expanding the productivity of commercial-smallholders 
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and maintaining a vibrant and competitive agricultural sector (Aliber and Hall, 2009). 
Commercial-smallholder farming has been promoted through several government 
support programmes. These programmes include land reform policies, additional 
grant money for farm improvements and initial operational costs, and use of mentors 
or strategic partners, the purpose of whom is to ensure adequate farm and business 
management (Aliber and Maluleke, 2010).  
 
The land redistribution and restitution programmes targeted the resourced-poor 
commercial-smallholders and this led to failure of numerous projects. According to 
Aliber and Maluleke (2010), of projects delivered between 2001 and 2006, 29% were 
not actively involved in agricultural production and were generally deserted, and 
another 22% were producing extremely low outputs that generated low income. 
Nevertheless, there are a few commercial-smallholders‘projects that have been 
successfully integrated in the South African formal agricultural markets (Aliber, 
2011). The identified successful farmers were grouped into associations or 
cooperatives, and shared input costs, group labour, and marketed their produce 
collectively. These groups realised high production and farm gross margins (Aliber, 
2011). For increased number of successful commercial-smallholders, there is a need 
for government interventions to resurrect the large number of failed projects across 
the country (Aliber and Maluleke, 2010). In addition to land redistribution and 
restitution, the government of South Africa availed capital funding through its 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme – CASP (Aliber and Hall, 2009). In 
this programme, land reform beneficiaries were entitled to 70% share while other 
agrarian reform beneficiaries were entitled to only 30% of the capital funding (Aliber 
and Hall, 2009). However, this support has not yielded much in terms of saving the 
declining agricultural productivity of smallholders (Aliber and Hart, 2009). 
 
2.3 Risk and its effect on agriculture 
 
Risk and uncertainty are perceived as characteristics of agricultural production. They 
could arise due to biophysical factors such as inconstant weather events, diseases 
or pest infections (Adesina and Brosen, 1987). Other factors such as changing 
economic environment, introduction of new technologies or crops, and uncertainties 
surrounding the public institutions and their policy implementation also combine with 
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these natural factors to create a surplus of yield, price and income risks for farmers 
(Anderson, Dillon, and Hardker, 1985; Mapp and Persaud, 1979). The risk situation 
is severe in majority of agriculture in sub- Saharan Africa. The low and high 
inconsistent rainfall and the absence of institutional innovations (e.g. disaster 
payments) too shift part of the risks from the private sector to public sector, makes 
risk management a critical part of farmers’ decision making (Shapiro, Sanders, 
Reddy and Baker, 1993). 
Risk is an issue that affects many aspects of people’s livelihoods in developing 
countries. It is a persistent characteristic of life in developing countries, mainly in the 
rural areas (IFAD, 2008; World Bank, 2005). The economic stability of any rural area 
can be destroyed by crises caused by different types of natural disasters such as 
livestock diseases and climatic conditions. According to IFAD (2008b) almost 1.4 
billion people live on less than US$1.25 a day, seventy percent of which reside in the 
rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and are also at risk from recurring 
natural disasters. Natural disasters have a negative impact on food security and 
overall social and economic development of poor rural households. 
According to the World Bank’s (2001) World Development Report, agriculture and 
agribusiness are the primary sources of income for most families and businesses in 
developing countries. Agriculture’s dependence on weather, such as rainfall leads to 
production risk and affects the farmers’ ability to repay debt, to meet land rents and 
to recover essential living costs for their families. The instability of farmers and 
producers leads into macroeconomic vulnerability (Guillaumont, Jeanneney and 
Brunn, 1999; Benson and Clay, 1998).  
Many researchers have found that risks cause farmers to be less willing to undertake 
activities and investments that have higher expected outcomes, but carry with them 
risks of failure (Alderman, 2008 and Adebusuyi, 2004). Dercon (2002) states that the 
failure to cope with agricultural risk is not only reflected in household consumption 
but also affects nutrition, health and education and contributes to inefficient and 
unequal intra- households allocations. Traditional risk reducing strategies helps to 
cope with risky incomes (Morduch, 1999).  Although the distinction between risk 
management and risk strategies may seem important from a theoretical point of 
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view, its importance is less from a practical point of view because farmers 
experience both fear and fate in their daily lives (Dercon, 2007). 
 
2.4 Types of risks in agriculture 
 
All agricultural enterprises, most especially in developing countries operate under a 
situation of risk or uncertainty (Meuwissen, Huirne and Hardaker, 2001). Five 
general types of risks are described by Hardaker et. al (2004). They are described as 
follows: production risk, price or market risk, financial risk, institutional risk and 
human risk. 
 Production risk is referred to as the uncertainty of natural growth processes of 
crops and livestock. Weather, disease, pests, and other factors affect both the 
quantity and quality of commodities produced (Langeveld, Verhagen, Van 
Asseldonk and Metselaar, 2003). 
 Price or market risk is the uncertainty about the prices producers will receive for 
commodities or the prices they must pay for inputs (inputs costs). The nature of 
price risks varies with each commodity. 
 Financial risk results when the farmer borrows money and creates an obligation 
to repay debt.  Rising interest rates, the prospect of loans being called by lenders 
and restricted credit availability are also aspects of financial risk. 
 Institutional risk refers to uncertainties surrounding government actions. Tax 
laws, regulations for chemical use, rules for animal waste disposal, and the level 
of price or income support payments are examples of government decisions that 
can have a major impact on the farm business (Wolf, Just,Wu and Zimberman, 
1998). 
 Human risk refers to factors such as problems with human health or personal 
relationship that can affect the farm business. Accidents, illness, death, and 
divorce are examples of personal crises that can threaten a farm business 
(Hartman, Frankena, Oude, Nielen, metz and Huirne, 2004). 
These risks can be interrelated and one event can cause several impacts on other 
realities. All the categories of risk have an effect on the income of the stakeholder. 
Risk perceptions can vary from one farmer to the other, from sector to sector, from 
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product to product depending on farmer’s experiences and the degree of risk 
aversion. 
 
2.5 Adoption of agricultural technology 
 
2.5.1 Theories on adoption of technology 
 
Adoption refers to the process where an individual passes through since they heard 
of innovation (technology) until it starts to be used on a continuous basis (Rogers, 
1991). Technology is defined as any idea, object or practise that is perceived as new 
by the members of a social system. A product innovation is an end product for 
consumption while a process innovation is an input to a production process (Rogers, 
1991). A distinction must be made between the individual adoption by a firm or 
farmer and the aggregate adoption. The level of adoption is the degree or intensity 
with which a new technology is used when the farmer has complete information 
about it. It can be measured as the amount of use of that technology or as the farmer 
use or not uses that technology (Zilberman, 1985). Adoption is the outcome of a 
dynamic decision making process that includes learning about the technology 
through the collection of information. 
Technologies play an important role in economic development (Carteling, Di 
Benedetto, Doree, Halman and Song, 2011). In agriculture, among the most 
frequently advocated strategies for climate adaptation and economic development is 
technology research and development (Rosenberg, 1992). Technological change 
can lead to productivity growth by either expanding the total output or increasing 
application of the relatively cheap inputs and trimming down use of the more or less 
expensive inputs (Huffman and Evenson, 1993). 
 
2.5.2 Factors affecting adoption of technology by smallholder farmers 
 
The uptake of new technologies or farming practices has attracted considerable 
interest over the years. The majority of the studies tend to focus on the classics 
comparison between adopters and non- adopters (Dadi, Burton and Ozane, 2004) 
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with very few studies investigating the differences between early and late adoption of 
technologies in general and irrigation farming in particular. 
 
2.5.3 Function of age in technology adoption 
 
Age is a primary characteristic in adoption decisions. However, there is controversy 
on the direction of the effect of age adoption. Age was found to positively affect the 
adoption of sorghum in Burkina Faso (Adesina and Baidu- Forson, 1995).  The effect 
is thought to result from accumulated knowledge and experience of farming systems 
obtained from years of observation and experimenting with various technologies. 
Adoption pay- offs occur over a long time and, while costs occur at earlier stages, 
age of the farmer can have profound effect on technology adoption. A study 
conducted by Bembridge (1991) on maize technology transfer in a typical homeland 
maize- growing area in South Africa established that 30% of producers were sixty 
years of age.  
Age has been found to be correlated with adoption or not significant in farmers’ 
adoption decisions. Similar studies by Kirsten and Jerkins (2003) and Adesina and 
Baidu- Forson (1995) established that age was either significant or was negatively 
related to adoption. Older farmers, because of investing several years in a particular 
practice, may not want to jeopardise it by trying out a completely new method. 
Farmers’ perception that technology development and subsequent benefits, require 
a lot of time to realise, can reduce their interest in the new technology because of 
their advanced age, and the possibility of not living to enjoy it (Caswell, Fuglie, 
Ingram, Jans and Kascak, 2001; Khanna 2001). 
 
2.5.4 Function of gender in technology adoption 
 
Effective application of agricultural technologies in production has strategic 
implications. The productivity of labour will be altered depending on accessibility of 
the technology between men and women. In many smallholder farms, technology is 
mostly at the disposal of men whereas women contribute seventy percent of 
agricultural production (Lubwana, 1999). According to Doss and Morris (2001) there 
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is no significant association between gender and technology adoption of improved 
maize technology among farmers in Ghana. Phiri, Franzel, Mafogonya, Jere and 
Katanga (2004) showed that the adoption of improved fallow practices among 
house- holds in Zambia is neutral. Where else, Essa and Nieuwuldt (2001) in South 
Africa indicate that male farmers tend to adopt hybrid seed maize and fertilizer. They 
also argued that constraints to adoption of technology by women include socially 
conditioned inequalities in the access, use and control of resources and credit. They 
also reported a positive association between adoption of maize and the presence of 
male decision makers among smallholder farmer support programs in South Africa. 
 
2.5.5 Function of education and training in technology adoption 
 
Generally education is thought to create a favourable mental attitude for the 
acceptance of new practices especially if information- intensive and management- 
intensive practices on adoption (Caswell, et al., 2001). Education is perceived to 
reduce the amount of complexity perceived in technology thereby increasing 
technology’s adoption. According to studies conducted by Moser and Barrett (2003) 
education is an important determinant of production efficiency and technology 
diffusion. Formal education and training in agriculture improves farmers’ ability to 
acquire accurate information, evaluate new production processes, use new 
agricultural practices and understand the benefits of adopting appropriate farm 
practices (Hollaway, Shankar and Rahman, 2002). Education can encourage new 
technology adoption by lowering learning costs or it may discourage adoption by 
profitable off- farm employment opportunities and new technologies may reduce the 
ability of farm operators to substitute their inputs away from cultivation. 
Training is one of the most critical factors of the technology transfer processes. 
Stroebel (2004) stated that training to enhance technology transfer and adoption 
programmes at sheering steeds played an important role in training the small 
ruminant farmers in the correct use and adoption of medical technologies. There are 
many technologies available that do not require formal education level. In these 
cases training projects are essential to develop the desire for new technologies and 
its implementation by the farmers (Abdulai, Owusu and Bakang, 2011). 
20| P a g e  
 
2.5.6 Function of income in technology adoption 
 
Previous studies have shown the significance of income on technology adoption of 
improved agricultural technologies by smallholder farmers (Langyntuo and Mekuria, 
2005). Access to cash which promotes adoption of risky technologies through the 
relaxation of liquidity constraints as well as boosts the household’s risk bearing 
ability is hardly available to resource poor farmers for varied reasons (Langyintuo 
and lowenberg, 2006). Farm income may affect adoption negatively or positively 
depending on its contribution to household income and farm profitability. Farmers 
with more wealth and liquidity maybe better able to finance the adoption of new 
technologies and farming practices (Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001). 
Iqbal, Ireland and Rodrigo (2005) in Sri Lanka found that farmers who were likely to 
adopt to intercropping are those who rely principally on their own farm enterprise for 
their income. Non-agricultural incomes on the other hand can reduce risk associated 
with the trial of new technology. Lingyintuo and Mungoma (2008) showed that the 
relationship between wealth and technology adoption, using data from households in 
Zambia approved that within any given farming community, households on the upper 
part of the wealth scale are most likely to adopt new technologies because of their 
secure economic positions.  On the other hand  those on lower wealth scale that is 
smallholder farmers may be willing to adopt because of their greater desire for 
upward mobility in the economic group but are unable to invest in new opportunities 
and therefore lowest in terms of adoption of new techniques. 
 
2.5.7 Function of risk considerations in technology adoption 
 
Agriculture is a nature of risky activity, and farmers’ risk attitudes are known to 
deeply influence their choices, especially when dealing with new technology 
(Bocque’ho and Jacquet, 2010). Risk averse farmers are reluctant to invest in 
innovations about which they have little first- hand experience. Farmers who are risk 
averse will seek reducing strategies and technologies to adopt in their farming 
systems. That is why smallholder farmers will implement technologies that do not 
necessarily yield maximum net returns (Bocque’ho and Jacquet, 2010). Smallholder 
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farmers who consider adopting new technologies tend to be pessimistic about 
possible yield gains until they have more information on the results of new 
technology (Sanders, Shapiro and Ramaswamy, 1996). 
The adoption of new technologies is positively related to the degree of risk aversion 
(Kebede, 1992). Malawian maize growers’ perception of the relative riskiness of new 
seed varieties influenced the probability of their adoption and intensity of cultivation. 
This study provided strong evidence that the primary economic character of the 
adoption decision and also highlighted the importance of risk in the decision process. 
Risk aversion tends to reduce adoption and to a greater extend as relative riskiness 
and scale is increased. 
 
2.5.8 Function of land tenure in adoption 
 
According to Cotula (2006) land rights are the backbone of land tenure. Land rights 
include ownership and a range of other land holding and use rights which coexist 
over the same plot of land (Hogson, 2004). These rights may be based on national 
legislation, customary law or the combination of both. These rights may be held by 
individuals, groups, or by the state.  Land is arguably the most important asset in 
primarily agrarian rural societies especially in the rural areas of South Africa but is 
lacking in both ownership and size. There are restrictive administrative and social 
structures such as land tenure that should be improved. Most smallholder farmers 
have limited access to land and capital and have received inadequate or 
inappropriate research and extension support resulting in chronically low standards 
of living (NDA, 2005). This is due to the unproductive and inefficient use of land in 
the absence of appropriate research and extension services.  
 
There are various constraints that impede the growth of smallholder farmers varying 
from systems constraints, allocative constraints to environmental-demographic 
constraints (Kirsten, Perret and De Lange, and Undated). Some of the systems 
constraints are lack of access to land, poor physical and institutional infrastructure. 
The background of a smallholder farmer given above suggests that one of the main 
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constraints that smallholder farmers face is poor access to sufficient land. Agriculture 
is largely carried out under increasing pressure of scarce land resources managed 
under insecure customary land ownership and communal grazing land. These 
insecure tenure systems such as communal land tenure system constrain the 
farmers from producing to their highest potential (Kariuki, 2003). If farmers perceive 
their tenure as secure, they have an incentive to invest in land improvements and 
maintain existing improvements to increase productivity. However, policies such as 
the land reform process play a role in finding solutions for problems associated with 
limited access to land. In South Africa, tenure reform is a component of a national 
land reform programme which also embraces the restitution of land, to people 
dispossessed by racially discriminatory laws or practices, and land redistribution to 
the poor (Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999). 
 
Hazell and Lutz (1999) have demonstrated that the rights that farmers have over 
natural resources can be important in determining whether they take short- term or 
long- term perspective in managing resources. Farmers who feel that tenure is 
insecure, with or without formal rights are less likely to be interested in conserving 
resources or making investments that improve the long term productivity of 
resources. Therefore stronger land rights and presence of land title are often 
associated with an increased livelihood of adoption and investment in new 
agricultural technology. 
 
According to Placeand Braselle, (2009), although there are strong theoretical 
reasons why more complete land rights are expected to enhance agricultural 
technology investment, empirically this link has been found to be weak. Some of the 
reasons are adequate incentives in African tenure systems, thin credit market, 
endogenous tenure, failures of tilting programs and empirical difficulties. Community 
rights over land discourage investment because the community fears negative 
externalities from investments made (Besley, 1995). Collective management 
inhibited the adoption of new crops and new techniques by requiring consensus 
(Pannell, Marshall, Barr, Curtis, Vanclay and Wilkinson, 2006). When land is owned 
by the state, existing tenure arrangements may not give security to the holder, and 
the state can block endogenous institutional change (Hagos and Holden, 2006). 
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Investment incentives may be sufficient even if endogenous tenure is insecure. If 
individuals are altruistic towards other members of the community, they may not be 
discouraged by the possibility that land will revert to the larger group. However, if 
output is shared, the rest of the community members should encourage investment 
by its individual members (Besly, 1995). In the case of tenancy contracts, the threat 
of eviction can be used to elicit greater efforts from the tenant (Banerjee and Ghatak, 
2004). Investment in agriculture competes with investment in capital goods, which 
are recoverable in the event of eviction. Even given insecurity, returns in agriculture 
may still be higher (Hayes, Roth and Zepeda, 1997). 
 
2.6 Adoption of Agricultural Production Technology in South Africa 
  
In South Africa, a wide range of technologies have been innovated and transferred to 
farmers to boost productivity and production efficiency (Kodua-Agyekum, 2009; 
DAFF, 2010). Establishment of irrigation schemes, animal traction, improved seed, 
fertilizers and agro-chemical application are among the technologies developed to 
benefit farmers. Black smallholders and subsistence farmers have been among the 
targeted beneficiaries of these technologies (Kodua-Agyekum, 2009; Van Averbeke 
et al., 2011). To ensure high adoption rates, the government of South Africa incurred 
investment costs to establish the irrigation schemes and provided input subsidies 
through rural development programmes (Kodua-Agyekum, 2009; Van Averbeke et 
al., 2011). However, adoption rates of these technologies such as irrigation, fertilizer 
and agro-chemical application among smallholder farmers seem to be low mainly 
due to poor extension services, low participation of farmers in decision making, and 
lack of investment capital (Kodua-Agyekum, 2009, DAFF, 2010).  
 
Large-scale farmers are more likely to adopt these technologies compared to 
smallholders because they have more investment capital to source for credible 
information about the new technologies and experiment on the new technologies 
(DAFF, 2010). Due to the relative increase in the cost of labour, large-scale farmers 
have resorted to adoption of labour-saving and intensive capital-using technologies 
(DAFF, 2010). Labour saving and intensive-capital-use technologies seem to be 
more productive and efficient though they may worsen the high unemployment and 
declining smallholder agriculture situation. Probably this may be due to high costs 
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associated with these new technologies and most rural-poor black farmers cannot 
afford adopting them (DAFF, 2010). For example, the use of long-lasting herbicides 
and more efficient mechanized agriculture which is costly, and has led to loss of 
employment among seasonal farm workers (DAFF, 2010). Low rates of adoption of 
new technologies especially on the small-scale irrigation schemes have led to low 
production efficiency, low productivity, low household incomes, unemployment, 
increased food insecurity and wide spread poverty levels among Eastern Cape‘s 
rural communities (Kodua-Agyekum, 2009). 
 
 
2.7 Commercialisation of agricultural products by smallholder farmers 
 
2.7.1 Defining commercialization 
 
Agricultural commercialization refers to the process of increasing the proportion of 
agricultural production that is sold by farmers (Pradhan, Dewina and Minsten, 2010). 
Commercialization of agriculture as a characteristic of agricultural change is more 
than whether or not a cash crop is present to a certain extent in a production system. 
It can take many different forms by either occurring on the output side of production 
with increased marketed surplus or occur on the input side with increased use of 
purchased inputs. Commercialization is the outcome of a simultaneous decision-
making behavior of farm house-holds in production and marketing (von Braun, Bouis 
and Kennedy, 1994).  It involves a transition from subsistence-oriented to 
increasingly market-oriented patterns of production and input use. Separation of 
household decision of production and consumption begins at the moment 
commercialization commences. Household decision-making of production and 
consumption is non-separable in subsistence farming while it is separable in market-
oriented farming (Gebre-Ab, 2006). In a situation where decisions are non- 
seperable, the objective of the household is to maximise utility and where it is 
completely separable, the objective is profit maximisation. 
 
 The objective of utility maximisation is dominant in the early phase of 
commercialisation whilst that of profit maximisation is dominates in the subsequent 
phase. Pingali and   Rosegrant (1995) classified farming systems as smallholder, 
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semi- commercial and commercial based on market orientation. The main purpose of 
smallholder farming is to produce to maintain food household self sufficiency. The 
semi- commercial system is focused towards generation of marketable surplus and 
maintaining household food security. In commercial system, profit maximisation is 
the main motive of the entrepreneur. Production of cash crops in addition to staples 
or even exclusively is another form of commercialisation. Moreover, 
commercialisation also involves the widening of the household’s market transactions 
relating to inputs and outputs. 
 
At the farm household level commercialization is measured simply by the value of 
sales as a proportion of the total value of agricultural output. At the lower end, there 
would always be some amount of output that even a basically subsistence farmer 
would sale in the market so as to buy basic essential goods and services. For this 
reason the ratio of marketed output up to a certain minimum level cannot be taken as 
a measure of commercialization. If the cut-off level for a certain country is put at, say, 
15 per cent, then it is the increase above this level that would be said to measure the 
extent of commercialization at the farm household level (Gebre-Ab, 2006). 
 
2.7.2 Commercialisation of smallholder farmers 
 
Commercialisation of smallholder farmers implies increased participation, or, rather 
an improved ability to participate in output markets. In the developing areas of South 
Africa, like in other developing countries, smallholder farmers find it difficult to 
participate in markets because of a range of constraints and barriers reducing the 
incentives for participation to markets and productive assets difficult (Pingali and   
Rosegrant,1995). 
 
The usual path of commercialization of smallholder agriculture starts with growth in 
the marketable surplus of staples. This could continue until it becomes the dominant 
portion of the total output of the household, or, there could be a diversification of the 
marketed portion into staples and other food crops. Another route consists of 
combining production of staples for own consumption with production of cash crop 
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for the market. Both, these routes, or, any variant of them, are the processes that 
took place in Asia's economic development. A third, and an unusual path is the 
replacement of subsistence production by cash crop production; a direct switch over 
from subsistence to market production. 
 
According to Gebreselassi and Sharp (2008) Countries like Ethiopia are likely to 
follow a two-track approach in the commercialization of smallholder agriculture, 
covering the usual and an unusual route. In the food crop surplus producing areas of 
the country, households would follow the normal pattern of progressively increasing 
the portion of marketed surplus in the total output, while in the food deficit areas 
households would shift towards producing for the market and relying on cash income 
to procure food crops from the market. These are respectively designated track one 
and track two hereafter. 
 
The increase in the ratio of marketed output though simple as an indicator of 
commercialization, carries with it a deeper change in farm household decision-
making behaviour. Household decision-making of production and consumption is 
non-separable in subsistence farming while it is separable in market-oriented 
farming. What to produce and how to allocate time between labour and leisure is 
differently decided upon in subsistence and commercialized farming. 
 
The most common form in which commercialization occurs in peasant agriculture is 
through production of marketable surplus of staple food over what is needed for own 
consumption. Another form of commercialization involves production of cash crops in 
addition to staples or even exclusively. To have a marketable surplus over the cut-off 
ratio of, say, 15 per cent normally involves an increase of household output of 
staples. This can be attained with the same level of inputs through adoption of best 
practices (technical efficiency), or with the same production function but greater 
utilization of the existing family labour (allocative efficiency), or with new technology 
consisting of production technique or product variety (productivity gains). Similar 
improvements at the farm level also apply to the introduction of cash (Pingali and   
Rosegrant, 1995). 
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2.8 Constraints to commercialization 
 
The transformation from smallholder to commercial agriculture is induced on both the 
demand and supply side. When the economy grows, urbanization takes place and 
food demand patterns are consequently diversified, there is an increase in the 
demand for marketed agricultural output. On the supply side, the opportunity cost of 
labour employed in the household will increase, when the opportunities to find better-
paid off-farm employment increase (Pingali 1997). This process assumes that well-
functioning markets are in place, transaction costs are reasonably low and 
information dissemination is efficient (Pingali 1997). 
2.8.1 Land 
 
Land is only one component of the operating environment that encourages 
commercialization. Given land, farmers should be able to produce, which requires 
channels for the delivery of knowledge, inputs, and machinery to the farms. In Sub-
Saharan Africa private property rights over a land – in the shape of legally 
recognised titles that can be exchanged in the market place – are less developed 
than elsewhere in the world. Although there are exceptions (e.g. in Kenya), 
traditional forms of land tenure still hold sway throughout much of the region.  
 
Understanding the social impact of agricultural commercialisation requires an 
understanding of these complex systems of property rights and how they affect 
access to land. Whilst land has historically been an abundant resource in Sub-
Saharan Africa (allowing agricultural growth to take place through extensification 
rather than intensification), rapid population growth is now making land scarce. As a 
result, new forms of property rights and new technologies are needed if land is to be 
exploited efficiently and sustainably. However, technological change and land reform 
creates social tensions and has major social and political ramifications, the nature of 
which determine whether or not the transition from subsistence-orientated agriculture 
to commercialised production takes place smoothly and in a way that benefits the 
poor. Platteau (1996) provides a review of the evolution of land rights in Africa, the 
social and economic implications, and associated difficulties. He notes that 
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customary land rights often provide protection for the poor including women and 
ethnic minorities which formal land titling can erode or eliminate 
 
 Land is arguably the most important asset in primarily agrarian rural societies 
especially in the rural areas of South Africa but is lacking in both ownership and size. 
There are restrictive administrative and social structures such as land tenure that 
should be improved. Most smallholder farmers have limited access to land and 
capital and have received inadequate or inappropriate research and extension 
support resulting in chronically low standards of living (FAO, 2010). This is due to the 
unproductive and inefficient use of land in the absence of appropriate research and 
extension services. Agriculture is largely carried out under increasing pressure of 
scarce land resources managed under insecure customary land ownership and 
communal grazing land.  
 
Despite the available land policies, few, if any, smallholder farmers have expanded 
their farms (Aliber and Hart, 2009). Partly, this may be attributed to increasing 
agricultural risks faced by the rural resourced-poor smallholders globally (Kisaka-
Lwayo and Obi, 2012). These risks may be as a result of introduction of new 
technologies, change in economic environment and uncertainties resulting from 
changes in public policies (Spio, 1997; Kisaka–Lwayo and Obi, 2012). In order to 
reduce risks, farmers diversify by growing several crops on small pieces of land. The 
diversification consequently has resulted into low subsistence agricultural production, 
less marketable surplus, low household incomes, food insecurity, unemployment and 
increased poverty levels (Kisaka–Lwayo and Obi, 2012). 
 
2.8.2 Access to credit 
 
For smallholder farmers access to credit is vital to any production, especially large 
scale for commercial purposes. This both credit to obtain assets over a longer period 
and production credit cyclical basis. The land bank played a limited role to finance 
smallholder farmers (May and Carter, 2009).The key revolves around the ability to 
bank of the applicant. The basis included that blacklisted creditors find it difficult to 
obtain reassessment of their status as a result of the inefficiency of the credit bureau 
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system. Any attempts to obtain loans therefore are unsuccessful because of this 
inefficiency, many poor people do not have credit references nor have had bank 
accounts, preferring to deal only cash which they have direct control over, or being 
part of farming arrangements where much of their has been held by white farmers. 
Many smallholder farmers do not have fixed employment- they are seasonal workers 
and rely on a variety of income sources which may not be regular but give them a 
steady supply of income. A number of their income sources, for example, the child 
support grant, are not recognized by the bank and thus reduces their total income in 
the determination of the loan and the ability to bank of the applicant. Smallholder 
farmers therefore complain that the bank does not seriously seek ways of supporting 
poor smallholder farmers and are frustrated in their attempts to engage in farming 
(May and Carter, 2009). 
 
The Land Bank was expected to fill the vacuum created by the demise of homeland 
parastatals. The mandate of the Land Bank has been broadened to include persons 
that were previously excluded from enjoying the services the bank provided. 
Machethe (2005) points out that even though the Land Bank has succeeded in 
reaching more smallholder farmers with loans, the majority of the farmers still do not 
have access to land. He goes on to explain that the realisation that insufficient 
progress has been made with regard to improving access to credit for smallholder 
farmers has prompted the government to establish the Agricultural Credit Scheme 
aimed at addressing credit needs of smallholder farmers. 
 
The challenge will be to simultaneously achieve the objectives of improving access 
to credit for smallholder farmers and ensuring financial sustainability of the scheme. 
In 2006, the Department of Trade and Industry presented a new Micro-Finance Apex 
Fund (SAMAF) which will provide seed capital, wholesale finance, and institutional 
development support to micro credit programs in the so called second economy. The 
SAMAF model together with the Department of Agriculture came up with a new 
initiative called Micro Agricultural Finance Schemes of South Africa (MAFISA) aimed 
at reaching down towards the low end credit market. According to Platteau (1996), it 
was envisaged that MAFISA would consist of a network of public, private and civil 
society organisations that work in cooperative based systems to provide financial 
services to farmers’ enterprises and households in rural areas. 
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2.8.3 Access to markets 
 
According to May and Carter (2009) smallholder farmers producing surpluses often 
do not have access to markets at whatever scale they are producing. In most of the 
cooperatives there have been restrictions on the size of undertaking of member. 
Only producers of a certain size or more could be members. This meant that 
smallholder farmers are excluded from the benefits of an organized marketing 
system, from a cheaper source of supplies and other benefits linked to the 
cooperative. It is the general experience that smallholder farmers do not have 
access to markets for their produce and have problems in association with the 
marketing of their produce including among many others, transport to the markets. 
According to Daily Dispatch (2003), roads in some parts of the Eastern Cape were 
almost inaccessible and vehicles are kept at huge cost. In main instances trucks 
could barely be used on the roads and tractors and trailers have to e used to load 
bales of wool May and Carter (2009)  
 
2.8.4 Lack of support 
 
Characteristics of a successful smallholder farmer are not only determined by what is 
embodied in the farmer himself, there are other external factors which will affect the 
success of the smallholder farmers. According to Kirsten, Perret, & de Lange 
(Undated), policy characteristics such as one sidedness, export orientation, research 
priorities, low agricultural investment, external influence, role of the price mechanism 
is underplayed, mediocre support services and lack of continuity in policies have 
emerged and lead to the conclusion that these policies were not perfectly formulated 
and applied thus they do not address the targeted problem. In addition, Kirsten et. al 
(1998) suggests that factors such as information sources, uncertainty and 
compatibility of the development objectives are factors that led to the Farmer 
Support Programme being rendered unsuccessful to some extent. It therefore 
follows that the factors affecting the success of smallholder farmers after intervention 
start right from the implementation stages of the initiative. 
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Smallholder farmers are typically severed by ineffective support systems, which do 
not understand, or take seriously the critical role of vigorous smallholder sector in 
development. This results in a framework unfriendly to smallholders (Bembridge, 
1988). Public sector agricultural support systems have limited experience with 
smallholder agriculture, inadequately trained professionals, poor financial and human 
resources, and are backed up by limited research in universities. 
 
 
2.8.5 Transaction costs 
 
Makhura (2001) elaborated on the concept of transaction costs and explained them 
as those costs that are embodiment of access barriers by resources poor farmers. 
These transaction costs include searching, screening, bargaining, monitoring, 
enforcement and transfer of product. Transaction costs also include physical costs of 
distance, infrastructure and information and have a tendency of widening the price 
band between selling and buying. 
 
The high transaction costs of providing formal credit in rural markets imply that the 
costs of borrowing decline with loan size (Van Zyl, 1995). Many commercial banks 
do not lend to small farmers because they assume the farmers cannot make profit. 
Raising interest rates on small loans does not overcome this problem, since it 
eventually leads to adverse selection. For a given credit value, therefore, the costs of 
borrowing in the formal markets is a declining function of the amount of owned land. 
However, the amount of smallholder farmers can borrow for consumption are usually 
tiny, and often only at high interest rates.  
 
Transaction costs in markets are not frictionless and without cost. The role of 
transaction costs in completely hindering or limiting the level of smallholder market 
participation has been examined by several authors (Alene, Manyong, Omanya, 
Mignouna, Bokanga and Odhiambo, 2008; Barret, 2008) among others. Transaction 
costs can be classified into two types: fixed and proportional transaction costs (Key 
et al. 2000). Searching, monitoring, screening etc. are some of the fixed transaction 
costs. This transaction costs are highly household or commodity- specific, non- 
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variant with the transaction costs, as the name indicates, are proportional to the 
volume under transaction (Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000). Using empirical 
evidence, Renkow, Daniel, Hallstrom and Karanja (2004) showed that fixed 
transaction costs in maize- producing semi- subsistence households is one of the 
major deterrents to market participation. According to these authors, fixed costs were 
estimated to be 15.5% of the price band in maize market prices. 
 
Since the specific types and levels of transaction costs vary by households, 
locations, and commodities transacted (Pingali, Khwaja and Meijer 2004), there is no 
single public or private innovation or intervention that can reduce them. Therefore, it 
is essential to focus on a variety of integrated arrangements that fit into the existing 
realities on the ground. Among others, these arrangements could include contract 
farming (Glover, 1994) and development of smallholder organizations aimed at 
reducing marketing costs (Govereh, Jayne and Nyoro, 1999; Alene et al. 2008) and 
costs of inter-market commerce (Barrett, 2008), achieving continuous and reliable 
supply of marketed commodities produced by smallholders (Dolan and Humphrey 
2000), and facilitating market information provision via improved telecommunications 
(Pingali et al. 2004).   
 
 
2.9 Advantages of commercialisation  
 
Commercial agriculture has contributed to employment by increasing the demand for 
hired labour (Bembridge and Williams, 1990). During the peak of harvesting time, 
commercial farmers do employ temporary labour, in this way income redistribution 
occurs. Van Rooyen, Vink and Chrisodoulou, (1987) observed that intensive 
agricultural factors associated with commercial agriculture draws family labour and 
hired labour back to agriculture, and this is favourable. Also, the development of 
smallholder farmers occurs by learning skills and adopting technology which is used 
by commercial farmers. 
 
Commercial farmers also offer economies of scale (Van Zyl, 1995). It provides food 
for the country. It provides food at both national and international levels (Delgado, 
1995).  It provides raw materials such as wool, mohair, hides, pelts, horns and hoofs 
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originate from the agricultural sector (Shackleton, Shackleton and Cousins, 2000). 
These are processed further (forward linkages) to make household articles and 
clothing such as shoes, leather jackets, blankets, belts, purses and bags, key 
holders etc. The horns and hoofs are used for the manufacturing of glue. Other 
materials rejected in abattoirs and butcheries i.e. unfit for human consumption are 
used to make fertilizers (backward linkages). Also, some crops such as sunflower 
produce valuable oils which are extracted and processed to make cooking oil. 
Perfumes are also by-products from crops such as Pteronia incana (Peter, 2001). 
 
2.10 Role of risk in the commercialization process 
 
The role of risk in a smallholder commercialization process can be seen from two 
perspectives: before and after shifting from subsistence to semi-commercial 
production system. First, perceived risks in labour and food markets compel 
subsistence farmers to stick to the self-sufficiency objectives both in their production 
and consumption decisions. Second, unreliable and costly food markets and 
fluctuations in market prices put the relatively market-oriented resource allocation 
decisions of semi-subsistence households at stake due to less reliability of food 
markets to guarantee household food security (Von Braun et al. 1994; Govereh et al. 
1999). Reserving the discussions on the overall impact of risk on household 
resource allocation decisions for Section 7, this subsection briefly discusses why 
risks are higher under commercialized agriculture and what implication this has on 
the overall commercialization process.  
 
Agricultural commercialization leads to a more specialized pattern of production at a 
household level (Timmer 1997). A specialized production by its nature is highly 
susceptible to the risks of fluctuating prices and yields which results in fluctuating 
household income. To continue the commercialization process under unforeseen 
income shocks, either credit markets have to be easily accessible or semi-
commercial households have to put some of their good-year income in a form of 
quasi-liquid assets for consumption smoothing in a bad year. To mitigate risks 
related to smallholder commercialization and keep households in the move towards 
a fully commercialized agriculture, Timmer (1997) stressed that governments have to 
play a crucial role in designing and implementing the necessary policy measures that 
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could help smallholders in designing their own risk-management and risk-sharing 
strategies. 
 
2.11 Sources of risk 
 
Considerable studies have been conducted to identify the sources of risk that affect 
agricultural producers. Flaten, Lien, Koeslig, Valle and Ebbesvik (2005) argue that 
smallholder farmers are exposed to additional and different sources of risk compared 
to commercial farmers. Le Cheong (2010) conducted a study on cat fish farmers to 
get an understanding of farmer’s perception of risk and risk management strategies 
in catfish farming. The results suggested that, the price and production risks were 
seen as the most important sources of risk. Salmonu and Falusi (2009) examined 
the sources of risk in Nigeria for the last three years, and the study identified the five 
major sources of risk which were classified as market failure, price fluctuations, 
drought, pest and disease attack and erratic rainfall as the most important sources of 
risk affecting food crop farmers in Nigeria. Some of the sources were crop diseases, 
bush fire out break and flood disaster. These had effect on the reduction in farmers’ 
productivity, reduction in farmers’ income and food shortage. 
 
Meuwissen, Huirne and Hardaker (2001) studied farmers’ perception of risk and risk 
management strategies among livestock farmers and the results revealed that price 
and production factors were perceived as the important sources of risk. Insurance 
schemes were perceived as the relevant strategies to manage risks. Output price 
and cost were ranked as the highest among the production and financial risks of 
California agricultural producers (Blank and McDonald, 1995). Irregularity in input 
availability, fluctuations in market prices, and irregularity in water supply and 
variability in weather conditions were also identified as major sources of risk 
responsible for variation in farmers’ income in dry season farming. 
 
Many factors including vagaries of nature, diseases, insect infestations, general 
economic and market conditions contribute to the price, yield or net return variability 
of agricultural producers (Ostotimehi, 1996). According to Kinsey, Burger and 
Gunning (1998) harvest failures were identified as major sources of risk of rural 
households in a resettlement area in Zimbabwe. A few studies have found out that 
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geographic location, farm type, institutional structures, and other factors affecting the 
operating environment of farmers influenced farmers’ perception of risk and risk 
management. The study also revealed the complexity and individualistic nature of 
risk perceptions and selection of management tools (Wilson, Dalhran and Conklin 
1993). 
 
2.12 Sources of risk among South African farmers 
 
Studies conducted in south Africa were used to identify the perceived importance of 
multiple risk sources include studies by Hardman, Darrock, and Ortman (2002), 
Woodburn, Ortman and Levin (1995). The study by Woodburn et al (1995) was to 
determine risk sources and strategies, the study suggested that crop gross income, 
government policy, livestock gross income, credit access, government regulation and 
costs as the source of risk. Stockil and Ortman (1997) conducted a survey on the 
perception of risk among commercial farmers and analyzed the importance and 
dimensions of risk sources. The study concluded that the changes in costs of farm 
inputs, government legislation (tax, labour, and land redistribution). The rand 
exchange rate and product prices were the most important sources of risk. The 
analysis showed that risk exists, including changes in government policy, enterprise 
gross income, credit access and cost changes. 
 
 A similar study among vegetable farmers was conducted in Kwazulu Natal by 
Bullock, Ortman and Levin (1994) and identified price, climate and yield variability as 
the major sources of risk in vegetable production. The results showed that 
governmental policies added to the level of uncertainty faced by vegetable farmers. 
A comparative analysis among small and large farmers showed differences in their 
perceptions of risk. Small farmers perceived changes in credit availability and 
changes in input costs to be more important risk sources than large farmers, while 
large farmers are more concerned with changing interest rates. Another study 
revealed that sources and responses to risk in farm production, marketing and 
financing. The main sources of risk were considered to be varieties in livestock 
production, rainfall and livestock prices, the threat of land reform, and changes in 
input costs.  
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2.13 Risk management strategies 
 
Farmers perception of and responses to risk are important in understanding their risk 
behaviour (Flaten et al., 2005). Beal (1996) stated that it is to be expected that 
management strategies adopted by farm managers reflect their personal perceptions 
of risk and managing such risks is critical for the long term success of individuals and 
economic systems alike. The specific strategies through which food producers 
attempt to control risk, however, are varied and diverse. Some combination of 
diversification and intensification methods for risk management may be employed in 
a given area, community, or household and neighbouring groups may choose 
different mechanisms for risk reduction when faced with practically identical 
subsistence challenges (Hendrich and Mc Elreath, 2002). Risk management can be 
defined choosing among alternatives to reduce the effects of risk. This requires an 
evaluation of tradeoff between the changes in risk, expected returns and 
entrepreneurial freedom among others. For an individual farmer, risk management 
involves finding the preferred combination of uncertain outcomes and varying levels 
of expected returns (Boehlje and Lins, 1998). Risk management strategies can 
reduce the exposure of the farm business such as enterprise diversification; 
transfers risk to another party through outsourcing certain aspects of the farm 
operations, such as production contracting, or improve the farmers’ capacity to bear 
risk, such as maintaining liquidity assets (Scarry, 2008). Risk management cannot 
be viewed as a “one size fits all” action. Several key decision making criteria that 
play into the risk management planning process include the goals established from 
the operation, the risk bearing ability of the farm and the managers’ attitude towards 
risk. Each one of these will be different for individual family members and each 
farming unit (Wilson, et.al, 1993). 
 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2000) in a review of risk 
management strategies used by US farmers established that while enterprise 
diversification can be efficient for risk reduction for smaller farms it is not necessarily 
the case for large farms and wealthier operators. The degree of diversification in 
farming also varies significantly across regions and farm sizes. The reason that 
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could account for this situation are the differences and limitations in farm resources, 
expertise, market out let, weather conditions and farmers risk aversion(Harwood, 
1999). Alderman and Paxson (1994) presented a whole range of strategies and 
distinguished between risk management strategies and risk coping strategies. Each 
category involves a number of specific actions but can be summarised as in 
Fafchamps (1999). He classified them into 1) to reduce exposure to shocks ex-ante 
2) to cope with shocks ex-post (fate), rural households use self assurance via 
precautionary savings, borrowing, liquidation of assets, smoothing consumption, 
labour sales and solidatory through risk sharing networks. 
 
When farmers do not have or when they are not willing to sell their productive 
assets, they increase their labour supply. This includes being engaged in nonfarm 
activities during less extreme conditions, using child labour and labour bonding 
during extreme conditions (Fafchamps, 1999). De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) found 
that risk sharing is mainly achieved through private gifts, private loans and labour 
transfers. However, risk sharing among households from the same village will not 
adequately insure them against covariate risks like hurricane, drought or other 
negative shocks that have a positive covariance between households such as price 
shocks. All households in the same area are affected at the same time. Therefore, 
nobody from the same area can help each other. Assistance has to come from 
outside the affected area. 
 
Although traditional risk management strategies mitigate only a small part of overall 
risk (Alderman, 2008) in the absence of insurance and financial markets, households 
use a combination of these strategies as substitutes to deal with agricultural risks. 
According to Tomek and Hikaru (2001), farmers are assumed to select a 
combination of strategies, for example, maximize net expected returns (profits) 
subject to the degree of risk they are willing to accept clearly, risk management 
strategies in agriculture vary with farm characteristics and the risk environment. 
Farmers risk perception, risk attitudes, objectives as well as the available resource 
base, influence their decisions and actions. 
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2.14 Analysis of smallholder farmers risk preferences in developing countries 
 
Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) measured the risk preferences for 103 subsistence 
farmers in Brazil. Mind experiments involving choice between risky and sure farm 
alternatives were used to assess risk attitudes of samples of small farm owners and 
sharecroppers in Brazil. According to Dillon and Scandizzo (1978), results indicate 
that most subsistence farmers are risk averse, and that risk aversion tends to be 
more common and perhaps greater among owners than sharecroppers. In an 
expected utility context, distribution of risk attitude coefficients (based on mean-
standard deviation, mean-variance, and exponential utility functions) was diverse 
and not necessarily well represented by an average sample value (Dillon and 
Scandizzo, 1978). Further, econometric analysis done by regressing the risk 
preference against various socioeconomic variables indicated that income level and 
other socioeconomic variables influenced peasants’ risk attitude.  
 
Binswanger (1980) conducted a field experiment with 330 farmers in rural India for 
both real and hypothetical gambles using lottery choice tasks. When payoffs were 
small, about half the respondents were in the intermediate and moderate risk-
aversion categories. Binswanger‘s (1980) study found that nearly a third of the 
respondents were close to risk-neutral or risk-loving, and less than 10% were 
severely risk-averse. However, as payoffs rose, nearly 80% of the subjects displayed 
moderate risk-aversion, and risk-neutral or risk-loving behavior almost disappeared. 
Arrow's prediction held - absolute risk-aversion declined as payoff increased. Here 
an individual's willingness to accept small bets of a fixed size increased as wealth 
increased (Arrow, 1971). However, contrary to Arrow's hypothesis, the subjects also 
displayed decreasing relative risk aversion (Binswanger, 1980).  
 
A series of laboratory experiments were conducted in China by Kachelmeier and 
Shehata (1992) to elicit people's certainty equivalents for a sequence of lotteries. 
Ten sessions were conducted with 185 student volunteers at Beijing University. The 
study differed from Binswanger's (1980) in that here, subjects were not asked to 
choose between lotteries. Rather, certainty equivalents were elicited for individual 
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lotteries. Several percentages depicting different win levels were used (not just the 
uniform 50-50% chances that Binswanger (1980) used). Subjects were presented 
with a lottery involving a prize of value G with probability P, and zero with probability 
(1-p). If the subject drew a card with a number less than or equal to p, they were 
awarded the prize. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) found that the average ratios of 
certainty equivalents to expected values for the high-prize trials were systematically 
lower than the ratios for low-prize trials, across win percentages. Once again, there 
was a marked trend from risk-loving or risk neutral preferences to risk-averse, as 
payoffs increased. 
  
Holt and Laury (2002) presented subjects with simple choice tasks that may be used 
to estimate the degree of risk aversion as well as specific functional forms. They 
conducted this experiment under both real and hypothetical conditions, using a menu 
of paired (Option A and option B) lottery choices, similar to Binswanger (1980). The 
payoffs for Option A, $2.00 or $1.60, were less variable than the potential payoffs of 
$3.85 or $0.10 in the "risky" option B. The probabilities were explained using throws 
of a ten-sided die, and ranged between 1/10 and 10/10(sure win). Holt and Laury 
(2002) controlled for wealth effects between the high and low real-payoff treatments, 
by subject being required to give up what they had earned in the first low-payoff task 
in order to participate in the high-payoff decision. Results from Holt and Laury (2002) 
showed that most subjects chose the safe option when the probability of the high 
payoff was small, and then "crossed over" to option B, almost never returning to A. A 
few more returned in the hypothetical treatment. Once again, the subjects showed 
increasing degrees of risk-aversion in the high-payoff treatments than the low-payoff 
treatments.  
 
This result is qualitatively similar to that reported by Kachelmeier and Shehata 
(1992) and Smith and Walker (1993) in different choice environments. The results 
indicate that most individuals are risk averse with little variation according to 
personal characteristics, although wealth has a slight negative effect on risk aversion 
especially at low pay offs (Holt and Laury, 2002). Distribution of risk aversion was 
more widely spread at low levels and for hypothetical gambles, suggesting at higher 
pay offs one is more likely to elicit true risk preferences. The results support the 
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hypothesis of increasing partial risk aversion with increasing payoff levels similar to 
Bas-Shira et al. (1997). 
 
2.15 South African research on farmers risk preferences 
 
Lombard and Kassier (1990) conducted a study on risk preferences of farmers in 
South Africa and found the degree on intertemporal stability in risk attitudes varied 
between the specified income levels and there seemed to be a negative relationship 
between the accuracy of the risk interval on the one hand and the consistency of 
choice on the other hand. The response to two control questions indicated a varying 
degree of consistency at each income level. Risk averse, risk seeking and risk 
indifferent attitudes are observed (Lombard and Kassier, 1990). 
 
 In their study Meiring and Oosthizen (1993) measured irrigation farmers’ absolute 
risk aversion coefficient by means of the interval approach. The study analysed the 
influence of adjustment of the absolute risk- aversion scale, as well as the 
cumulative distributions on respondents’ risk preferences. The consistency of risk- 
attitudes was also determined. Results of elicitation of risk preference established 
that majority of farmers is extreme risk preference: either risk- seeking or risk 
aversion. They further established that, the decision makers who completed who 
completed the questionnaire at the higher levels of bank balances were more 
constant than those who complete the questionnaire at lower levels. If the width, 
over which the distributions extend, increases, the preferences of a few farmers tend 
to change risk- neutral to risk- averse. Meiring and  Osthuizen (1993) concluded that 
by propagating the concept of probability distributions for the evaluation of risky 
alternatives, a better understanding of risk and risk management can be brought 
about, which will result in easier obtaining of risk measuring  results. 
 
2.16 Conclusion and Chapter summary 
 
Risk and uncertainty are perceived as characteristics of agricultural production. They 
could arise due to biophysical factors such as inconstant weather events, diseases 
or pest infections (Adesina and Brosen, 1987). Other factors such as changing 
economic environment, introduction of new technologies or crops, and uncertainties 
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surrounding the public institutions and their policy implementation also combine with 
these natural factors to create a surplus of yield, price and income risks for farmers 
(Anderson, Dillon, and Hardker, 1985). 
 
There are many obstacles to the growth of smallholder agriculture. One of the 
obstacles is the persistence to antiquated production technologies because farmers 
do not adopt to technologies whose benefits are do not well demonstrated and they 
do not see any incentives to adoption to improved practices. 
 
The importance of agricultural economics research is argued due to the fact that risk 
and uncertainty are quintessential features in agriculture. The terms are closely 
entwined to any decision making framework. The different opinions on the 
importance of risk and uncertainty are argued by various authors. There are different 
sources and types of risk in agriculture broadly characterised into business and 
financial risk. These are defined in detail. A review of literature on farmers’ source of 
risks globally and in South Africa is presented. The findings suggest that risks and 
risk management strategies vary across regions and farm types. As a result 
modelling should be adopted to the unique conditions of the domain being 
investigated and go beyond price and yield risks. The agricultural risk management 
strategies are aimed at mitigating against risk faced by farmers. The literature 
established that risk management include, exposure of the farm business risk, 
transferring risk to another party or improving the farmers capacity to bear risk. The 
chapter concludes by addressing the different methods of measuring risk 
preferences of agricultural producers, the criticisms and advantages of using such 
methods. 
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CHAPTER 3  
UTILITY THEORY AND THE MEASURE OF RISK AVERSION  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Risk is quintessential in agricultural activities and central to any decision making 
framework on new agricultural technology adoption. The case of the passage from 
homestead to smallholder farming exemplifies how a better understanding of risk 
may provide relevant contributions to fill that frequent gap between technologists and 
farmers in the evaluation of the possibilities to adopt and upgrade agriculture 
technologies necessary to achieve a more sustainable agriculture. This chapter 
commences with the overview of the utility theory and it further explains expected 
utility theory as defined by Von Neumann and Morgenstern is explored and the 
measures of risk aversion commonly used in the literature examined. The need to 
adjust the Arrow Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion is argued with supporting literature 
and the three common methodologies for eliciting farmers risk preferences are 
reviewed 
 
3.2 Utility theory 
 
Utility theory traces its ancestry back to the efforts of economists and 
mathematicians to develop an applicable theory of how a rational person ought to 
behave in the face of uncertainty and how, in fact, such a person does act. It was 
thought for a time that in economic situations people would act to maximize the 
expected value of money that would accrue to them. Thus the gamble of winning $10 
if a fair coin lands heads and winning nothing if it lands tails shows an expected 
value of 
 
(1/2)($10) + (1/2)($0) = $5. 
 
The rational man, under such a theory, should behave toward this gamble as if it 
were worth $5.It eventually became apparent that there are many instances when 
43| P a g e  
 
this idea is not applicable. Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782), a member of the illustrious 
Swiss family that produced eight mathematicians in three generations, presents one: 
"Let us suppose a pauper happens to acquire a lottery ticket by which he may with 
equal probability win either nothing or 20,000 ducats. Will he have to evaluate the 
worth of the ticket as 10,000 ducats; and would he be acting foolishly, if he sold it for 
9,000 ducats?" In a paper written in 1790, Bernoulli explored the idea that the utility 
of money— not it’s actual value — is what people attempt to maximize. He argued 
that the utility of a fixed amount of money was different for a pauper than for a rich 
man. A single dollar is more precious to the poor man than to the millionaire; the 
poor man would feel the loss of a dollar more than the rich man. The difference in 
the utilities of $10 and $11 is greater, Bernoulli believed, than the difference in the 
utilities of $1000 and $1001. In general, a fixed increase in cash results in an ever 
smaller increase in utility as the basic cash wealth to which the increase is applied is 
made larger. In mathematical terms, this says that the graph of utility as a function of 
money is concave.  
 
 
3.2.1 Graphical representation of the utility curve 
Figure 3.1 utility curve 
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The graph above illustrates the utility of money as a function of amount of money. 
Each increase in money increases utility, so the function is monotonically increasing. 
Fixed increases in money bring smaller increases in utility as money increases. 
Thus, the rate of change of utility is negative and the graph of function must be 
concave down. 
 
3.2.2 Mathematical representation of utility 
 
 
According to a standard (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) theoretical microeconomics text, 
the definition of a utility representation function is the following: 
A function u:X -> R is a utility function representing preference relation >~ if, for all x, 
y in X, x >~ y <=> u(x) >= u(y). 
R is the set of real numbers, 
X represents some set of alternatives, 
x and y are possible alternatives, and 
x >~ y means that "the consumer" values x at least as much as y. 
 
The various representation theorems deal with proving properties of u given certain 
properties of the preference relation >~. For example, given so-called rationality 
conditions on the preference relation (e.g. completeness, transitivity), then it can be 
proved that a continuous representation function u exists. Further conditions can be 
used to establish differentiability and other properties. However, these proofs are 
beside the point. The only thing they establish is that such a function exists, not that 
there is any equivalence between the preference relation and the utility function 
"representing" it. In other words, they merely permit one to restate in mathematical 
terms the verbal conditions expressing preference. They in no way establish 
equivalence between the utility function and the preferences, and so any results 
derived from the mathematical manipulations of the representation function cannot 
necessarily be applied to the preferences themselves. 
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3.3 Expected utility theory and the measure of the risk aversion of producers 
 
Expected utility theory (EUT) was defined by Von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
to explain the reasons behind individual choices involving risk. Since then EUT has 
been the basis for much of the decision-making theory (Gomez-Limon, Arriaza and 
Riesgo, 2003) and has the support of most agricultural economists (Schoemaker, 
1982; Robison and Hanson, 1997). All theoretical aspects of EUT related to 
agricultural economics have been discussed in classic works such as those of 
Hardaker et al. (1997), Robison and Barry (1987), Anderson et al. (1985) and Barry 
(1984). The theory assumes that there is a utility function U that assigns a numerical 
value to each alternative. As most economic decisions are expressed in monetary 
terms, the utility function may have wealth as argument (U (W)), measuring the 
satisfaction obtained from a given amount of money. However, the satisfaction from 
either a gain or a loss (U(X)) may also be used (Hardaker et al., 1997). In doing so, 
EUT allows the ranking of alternatives within the context of risk. 
The seminal works of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) paid attention to one of the key 
elements of decision theory (the measure of risk aversion of the economic agents). 
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) proposed two indicators that overcame the limitations 
in the use of a cardinal utility function in order to compare differences in risk 
attitudes. As such, the Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion for von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility function have been used extensively to analyse 
problems in the micro economics of uncertainty (Ross, 1981). The risk aversion 
concept in based on the behaviour of individuals whilst exposed to uncertainty. It is 
the reluctance of an individual to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather 
than another bargain with more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff (Gill, 
2007 and Levy, 2006). The Expected Utility (EU) theory essentially defines risk 
aversion in terms of the concavity or convexity of the decision maker¡¥s utility 
function at any particular point (Cox and Sadiraj, 2006; Eisenhauer, 2006). Friedman 
and Savage (1948) showed that the local concavity or convexity of to von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility function u(x), indicates the local risk preference of a 
decision maker. 
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A decision maker is described as locally risk averse (concave utility function), risk 
neutral (linear utility) function or risk loving (convex utility function) for a particular 
outcome level if u”(x) ˂ 0; =0; or ˃ 0 respectively where u”(x) is the second derivative 
of u (•) of the expected utility model of Von Neumann and Morgernstern (1944) which 
has recently been generalised by Machina (1982). This measure merely indicates 
the decision makers risk preference, but is not an appropriate measure of risk 
aversion as u”(x) is affected by the linear transformation of x, and consequently its 
magnitude provides no insight into the severity of the risk attitudes (Rabin and 
Thaler, 2001; Rabin, 2000; Pratt, 1964). Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) 
independently developed equivalent measures of risk preferences that allow for 
comparisons of interpersonal preferences- the Arrow-Pratt absolute and relative risk 
aversion coefficients. Arrow developed them from the probability premium (Babcock, 
Choi and Feinerman, 1993), whilst Pratt worked from the risk premium (Pratt, 1964). 
A third and relative measure of risk aversion is the partial risk aversion coefficient 
developed by Menezes and Hanson (1970). These measures are invariant to 
positive linear transformations of x. A decision maker is defined as risk averse, 
neutral or risk loving if these measures are less than, equal to, or greater than zero 
(Menezes and Hanson 1970; Pratt 1964). 
3.3.1 Arrow-Pratt measure of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) 
  
Also known as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, mathematically the 
coefficient for the ARA is calculated as: 
A (W) = -   
A (W) = A (x) = -   ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
Where w indicates total wealth and U" and U’ indicate the second and first 
derivatives of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, respectively. The 
measure of ARA is appropriate to describe situations in which total wealth has a 
fixed stochastic part- income and a variable non stochastic part- initial wealth (Bar-
Shira, Just and Zilberman, 1997). Arrow (1971) pointed out that it is natural to 
hypothesize that the individual’s willingness to undertake a certain risky project is 
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greater when he or she is wealthier. In other words, wealthier individuals should 
have a greater amount of risky assets in their portfolio. Thus the measure of ARA 
should decrease with wealth. 
The coefficient A(w) takes either positive or negative values for risk-loving or risk 
averse economic agents respectively. When the coefficient decreases as monetary 
value increases we have Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA). Alternatively, 
if the coefficient increases under the same set of circumstances we have Increasing 
Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA). Finally, if the coefficient does not change across the 
monetary level, the decision-maker exhibits Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
(CARA), which implies that the level of the argument of the utility function does not 
affect his or her decisions under uncertainty (Menezes and Hanson, 1970); Pratt, 
1964). Since A(w) is not a non-dimensional measure of risk aversion, its value is 
dependent on the currency in which the monetary units are expressed. To overcome 
the impossibility of comparing risk aversion among different economic agents Arrow 
(1965) and Pratt (1964) devised a non-dimensional measure called the Relative Risk 
Aversion (RRA) coefficient. 
 
3.3.2 Arrow-Pratt measure of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) 
 
Also known as the coefficient of relative risk aversion, mathematically the coefficient 
for the RRA is calculated as: 
  R (w)=-  --------------------------------------------------- (2) 
In situations where both the stochastic and non stochastic components of the wealth 
are changing proportionally, the appropriate measure is R(w). Arrow’s (1971) 
hypothesis is that when both initial wealth and the risky project are increased by the 
same proportion, the individual’s willingness to undertake the risky project is smaller. 
In other words, wealthier individuals should hold a smaller portion of risky assets in 
their portfolio. The R(w) coefficient measures the percentage change in marginal 
utility in terms of the percentage change in the monetary variable. Hence, relative 
risk aversion represents the elasticity of the marginal utility function which ranges 
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from 0.5 (slightly risk averse) to 4 (extremely risk averse). Anderson and Dillon 
(1992) classify agricultural producers according the R (w) coefficient. Although most 
authors consider values above 5-10 very unlikely (Kocherlakota, 1996), some 
studies report values of up to 30 (Kandel and Stambaugh, 1991). According to them, 
these values can be reasonable when the alternatives in place represent a gain or 
loss of 1% of the total wealth. As with the absolute risk aversion coefficient, there is 
Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion (DRRA), Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
(CRRA) or Increasing Relative Risk Aversion (IRRA) behaviour (Menezes and 
Hanson, 1970; Pratt, 1964). 
 
3.3.3 Measure of Partial Risk Aversion (PRA) 
 
Also known as the coefficient of partial risk aversion, mathematically the coefficient 
for the PRA is calculated as: 
P(wo, π) = -   ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) 
Where 
 Wo  denotes non stochastic initial wealth, and 
π denotes stochastic income 
At the point (w = wo + π), PRA is related to the measure of ARA and RRA as follows: 
P(wo, π) = πA (wo + π) 
P(wo, π) = R(wo + π)  ---------------------------------------- (4) 
The measure of partial risk aversion is unit less and appropriate to describe 
situations in which initial wealth is fixed and income is variable. Bar-Shira, et al. 
(1997) show that Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) implies Decreasing 
Partial Risk Aversion (DPRA) with respect to initial wealth and that Increasing 
Relative Risk Aversion (IRRA) implies Increasing Partial Risk Aversion (IPRA) with 
respect to income. The opposite does not necessarily hold. It is possible to have 
DRRA and IRRA at the same time. Menezes and Hanson (1970) alludes that partial 
49| P a g e  
 
risk aversion examines behavior when the prospect changes but wealth remains the 
same. Increasing Partial Risk Aversion (IPRA) implies a decrease in the willingness 
to take a gamble as the scale of the prospect increases. 
 
3.4 Using ARA to measure the decision makers risk aversion 
 
The Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient defined as A(x) =- u”(x)/u’(x) has appeared 
extensively in literature (Just, 2011; Bar-Shira, et al., 1997; Chavas and Holt, 1996). 
Although the ARA are invariant to linear transformations of the u (King and Robison, 
1981) they are not invariant to arbitrary rescaling of x or a change in the range and 
scale of x (Raskin and Cochran, 1986), rendering ARA neither employable in 
secondary studies, nor comparable between studies without prior adjustments (Just, 
2011). The Initial work of Pratt (1964) best demonstrates the impact of both scale 
and range on ARA [A(x)]. According to Pratt (1964), to measure a decision maker's 
local aversion to risk, it is natural to consider his risk premium for a small, actuarially 
neutral risk Ў. 
Pratt (1964) developed a relationship between risk premium, the variance of the risky 
prospects and ARA as being: 
Π (x, Ў) =  ------------------------------------------------------------------ (5) 
Where: 
Π (x, Ў) is the risk premium given a level of wealth and a risky prospect; 
  is the variance of the risky prospect; 
A(x)  is the Absolute Risk Aversion at level of wealth x; and 
 are the higher order terms in the Taylor series expansion of the expected utility 
function around the mean of x 
Solving for A(x) in equation 5 yields: 
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A(x) =  --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (6) 
If, following Tsiang (1972) the dispersion of the risk prospect is assumed small 
relative to wealth, then may be neglected. 
Thus, A (x) is approximately given by: 
A(x) ≈ 2π(x, Ў)/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (7) 
This exposition is similar to that presented by Mc Carl and Bessler (1989) as part of 
their discussion on estimating an upper bound on the ARA when the utility function is 
unknown. The exact and approximate expression of A(x) clearly indicates that A(x) is 
dependent on both x and the risk situation, Ў. Thus the ARA has associated with it a 
unit, the reciprocal of that unit with which Ў is measured since the certainty 
equivalent is divided by the variance of Ў. Because  and E(Ў) affects A(x), the 
magnitude of A(x) is not affected by the use of incremental rather than absolute 
returns, or vice versa. 
Furthermore it is apparent that the change in  will affect ARA. For example a 
mean preserving increase in risk i.e. increases whilst x and the expected value of 
Ў remain constant will decrease A(x). This discussion provides an explanation to 
McCarl’s(1988) concern that if the magnitude of ARA is unaffected by use of 
incremental rather than absolute terms as hypothesized by Raskin and Cochran 
(1986) then one could abandon the wealth concept and only look at income. 
Cochran and Raskin’s (1987) reply agrees with McCarl (1988) without explaining 
how ARA are a function of both initial wealth and stochastic income. 
Given the sensitivity of ARA to the scale of data as well as the range of data it is 
somewhat surprising that ARA have appeared in so many publications without also 
providing sufficient information about the source of the ARA coefficients or the range 
and scale of stochastic wealth to allow comparisons with other studies (Cochran, et 
al., 1985; Collender and Zilberman, 1985; Danok, McCarl and White ,1980; Holt and 
Brandt, 1985; King and Oamek, 1983; King and Robinson, 1981; Tauer, 1986; Ye 
and Yeh, 1995; Zacharias and Grube, 1984). 
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Arrow Pratt Risk Aversion coefficients are expressed in several studies to five 
decimal places and ranges from 12.17 (Chavas and Holt, 1996) and 6.0 (Meyer, 
1977) to .000000921 (Collender and Zilberman, 1985). Cochran (1986) stated that it 
“appears reasonable to expect that the preferences of the majority of farmers will be 
represented with the interval -.0002 to .0015 when measured at after tax net farm 
annual income levels” However Raskin and Cochran (1986) demonstrate that a pair 
of decision makers exhibiting seemingly close values of A(x) such as .0002 and 
.0003, respectively, would disagree on the value of the 10,001st dollar by a factor of 
three and on the value of the 50,001st dollar by a factor of 160. This demonstration 
emphasizes that researchers should not underestimate the importance of scale. 
The need for the explicit specification of the unit of the Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion 
might arise when elicited values are used outside the context of the original study 
(Mac Nicol, 2007; Just, 2011). If a risk aversion coefficient elicited over an outcome 
space measured in one unit is later applied over outcomes measured in another unit, 
it must be converted by the appropriate factor (Ferrer, et al., 1997). Raskin and 
Cochran (1986) propose 2 theorems to guide the approximation to necessary 
conversions: 
THEOREM 1 A(x) =r(x), Let r(x) = -u"(x)/u'(x). Define a transformation of scale on x 
such that w =x/c, where c is a constant, x is the outcome variable and w is a wealth 
level. Then r(w) = cr(x). 
THEOREM 2 A(x) = r(x). If v = x + c, where c is a constant, and v is a wealth level, 
then r(v) = r(x). Therefore, the magnitude of the risk aversion coefficient is unaffected 
by the use of incremental rather than absolute returns (or vice versa). 
The notion that range affects Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion is not new, Wiesensel and 
Schoney (1989) stated that Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion elicited from different income 
levels is not directly comparable. The notion that range affects Arrow-Pratt Risk 
Aversion is also implied in Mc Carl and Bessler’s (1989) approach of estimating an 
upper bound on Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion when the utility function is unknown. 
Kachelmeir and Shehata (1992) also suggested that risk preferences be measured 
as the ratio of the certainty equivalent to the equivalent value of the income 
distribution to permit comparison of risk preferences across lotteries of different 
range. 
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Feinerman and Finkelshtain (1996) used a similar approach based on the probability 
premium. These approaches have a drawback in that results cannot be directly 
applied to some stochastic efficiency techniques, e.g. mean-variance programming 
models and stochastic dominance with respect to a function. Babcock, et al. (1993) 
also note that when the range of wealth distributions varies, the risk premium, 
expressed as a proportion of gamble size (amount of wealth at risk) and the 
probability premium convey more information on risk preference than does Arrow-
Pratt Risk Aversion. Consequently Eisenhauer (2006) advocates consideration of 
these measures when selecting Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion coefficients to 
demonstrate the effects of risk preferences on decisions. It is apparent from the 
range of Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion elicited, borrowed and assumed, even in recent 
studies that many agricultural economists are unaware of the impact of range on 
Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion e.g. Bar-Shira et al. (1997), Chavas and Holt (1996), Saha 
et al. (1994b), Pope and Just (1991), Chavas and Holt (1990), Lins, Gabriel and 
Sonka (1981). Despite this suggested amendments to Raskin and Cochran’s(1986) 
first theorem, not all risk situations may easily be adjusted to be represented in terms 
of Rand income or wealth to enable comparison or analysis e.g. in environmental 
risk (Just and Pope, 2003). An approach is suggested entailing standardization of 
the data to uniform scale and range prior to calculating an adjusted Arrow Pratt 
Absolute Risk Aversion coefficient (ג*) (Nieuwoudt and Hoag, 1993). 
The approach outlined by Nieuwoudt and Hoag (1993) may be extended to 
multivariate utility analysis and applied to environmental analyses where say both 
wealth and environmental risks may be important. Elicited values are consistent with 
the absolute risk aversion matrix, R, derived by Duncan (1977) and defined by: R(x) 
= [-Uij /Ui- R] provides a complete representation of an agent’s risk preferences for 
multiple attributes that is consistent with the Arrow Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion 
coefficient. The diagonal elements represent the agent’s absolute risk attitudes with 
respect to the ith risky attributes. 
Whilst Raskin and Cochran (1986) have successfully made agricultural economists 
aware of the effects of the scale of data on the Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion many still 
seem unaware of the effect of range. This discussion has focused on the abilities of 
the Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion to convey information about risk aversion assumptions 
or measurements in research programs. It is shown that an amendment is necessary 
53| P a g e  
 
for Raskin and Cochran’s (1986) first theorem if Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion is to be 
adjusted for the range as well as the scale of data. It is imperative that sufficient 
information regarding the risk situation and the population are reported with elicited 
risk preferences (Ferrer and Nieuwoudt, 1997). Hence it is important that risk 
preferences should be reported in a consistent manner such that studies can easily 
be compared to one another. 
 
3.5 Methods for measuring the risk attitudes of agricultural producers 
 
Several approaches have been used to assess smallholder farmers’ risk attitudes. 
According to Robison, Barry, Kliebenstaein and Patrick (1984), Lins et al.(1981) and 
Young (1979), there are three basic methods of measuring the attitudes to risk of 
agricultural producers: i) Direct estimation of the utility function (DEU); ii) 
Experimental methods (EM); and iii) Observed economic behaviour. 
 Direct estimation of the utility function (DEU): This method involves direct 
interaction with the decision-maker, with the interview procedures designed to 
determine respondents’ points of indifference between certain outcomes and 
hypothetical risky options. Respondents’ preferred choices among alternative 
options are thus considered to be indicative of their risk preferences. 
Empirical application of the DEU approach includes Hardaker et al. (1997), 
Abadi Ghadim and Pannell (1999) and Feinerman and Finkelshtain (1996). 
The DEU method has been criticized as being prone to interviewer bias if 
conducted using hypothetical rather than real lotteries (Binswanger, 1980), 
subjectivity involved in the identification of the functional form of the utility 
function, preferences for specific probabilities (for example a 50:50 bet), 
confounding from extraneous variables, and negative preferences towards 
gambling (Young, 1979). Although risk preferences elicited using EM may be 
more reliable than those elicited using DEU methods (Gunjal and Legault, 
1995), budgetary restraints may preclude the researcher from asking 
meaningful questions (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), in which case use of 
DEU may be preferred to EM. 
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 Experimental methods (EM): This can be regarded as a variant of the DEU 
method, in which real gambles/bets are used instead of hypothetical gains 
and losses and from their responses, derive the respondents’utility function. 
Because this approach requires that financial compensation is paid to 
respondents as a function of their responses to each gamble, this approach 
has generally been carried out in populations with low per capita income and 
wealth, example Miyata (2003) in Indonesia, Grisley and Kellog (1987) in 
Thailand and Binswanger (1980) in India. 
 
 Observed economic behaviour: This method was developed in order to 
represent risk behaviour, tuning the models to fit actual data by adjusting the 
risk aversion coefficients, usually along with other coefficients. Furthermore, 
these models rely on either production theory under uncertainty (econometric 
models) or cropping pattern selection (mathematical programming). Bar-Shira 
et al., (1997), Chavas and Holt (1996, 1990); Saha et al. (1994); Pope and 
Just (1991); Myers (1989), Moscardi and Janvry (1977) and Wolgin (1975) 
present good examples of the first category, while for the latter we have Brink 
and McCarl (1978) and Wiens (1976). 
This approach is criticised for confounding risk behaviour with other factors 
such as resource constraints faced by decision makers (Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1990), thus making an individual appear more risk averse than he/she truly is 
(Binswanger, 1982). This is particularly important in developing countries 
where market imperfections are prominent and production and consumption 
decisions, therefore, are non-separable (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). 
Econometric approaches have advanced considerably over the past three 
decades, but remain data intensive and open to model misspecification 
problems. The advantage of EM and DEU approaches over econometric 
approaches is that the researcher can design experiments where many of the 
features are under the control of the experimenter. 
Young’s (1979) review shows that the principle uses of elicited risk aversion 
coefficients are for (a) farm management extension application, (b) technology 
adoption and rural participation applications, and (c) policy and predictive 
applications. He concluded that considerable heterogeneity in risk 
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preferences among individuals; requirements of frequent updating of 
individual risk preferences in response to changing objectives, information 
and attitudes; time, cost and practical problems associated with elicitation of 
risk preferences are likely to limit their use in extension programmes (Young, 
1979). 
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter commences by introducing the concept of utility theory and the 
graphical and mathematical representation of the theory. The expected utility theory 
is further explained highlighting the pros and cons articulated. The definition of risk 
aversion by Friedman and Savage (1948) in reference of Von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility function is outlined as is the measures or risk aversion 
by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964). They independently developed equivalent 
measures of risk preferences that allow for comparisons of interpersonal 
preferences. These are absolute risk aversion, relative risk aversion, partial risk 
aversion and the Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion coefficient. The case for and 
how to adjust the ARA for the range and scale of the data is also presented due to 
the importance of reporting risk preferences in a consistent manner such that studies 
can easily be compared to one another. Elicitation procedures are categorised as 
experimental methods (EM), direct elicitation of utility (DEU) approaches, and 
econometric methods. The EM and DEU approaches are advanced over the 
econometric approach in that the researcher can design experiments where many of 
the features are under the control of the experimenter and suited to the area under 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology for data collection and analysis for 
the study. A description of the background of the study area in the former Ciskeis’ 
homelands with the following sub- sections: the geographical location, history of the 
former homeland, demographics, natural resource base, agricultural potential and 
land use patterns in the area. Information on the sampling framework is presented 
and data methods and instruments used to obtain socio- economic, demographic, 
and institutional and household is described. The methodology of eliciting risk 
preference of sample farmers is also described using the ordered probit model. The 
chapter concludes by giving the empirical specifications and estimation procedures 
for the model. 
4.2 Study area 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of the former Ciskei homelands of the Eastern Cape 
 
 
The former Ciskei homelands are represented by the study areas of Melani village, 
Battlefield village and Binfield village (near Alice town) all situated in the Amatole 
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District municipality under Nkonkobe municipality. Figure 4.1 graphically show the 
former homelands of the Ciskei. The Amatole District Municipality is named after the 
legendary Amatole Mountains (Eastern Cape Tourism Board, 2011). Amatole is a 
diverse district Municipality in the province. It contains the popular Metropolitan in the 
country, the Buffalo City Metropolitan, which includes East London, King Williams 
Town and Mdantsane. Two thirds of the district is made up of the former homelands 
areas. The Amatole Mountains that lie north- west of King Williams Town give the 
district its name. The well-watered coastal strip gives way to the former Transkei 
Hillls (ECDC, 2008b). The district has a moderate Human Development Index of 
0.52. This district has over 1,635,433 inhabitants (Community Survey, 2007), and a 
moderately of 78 people per square kilometre. The population is mainly African with 
some whites and coloured. Amatole District Municipality has the second highest 
economy in the province. The private sector is dominated by manufacturing in the 
areas of motor industry, food processing, textiles and clothing.  
The following paragraph and subsections below describe the study areas in terms of 
geographical location, history of the former homelands, demographics, natural 
resources base, agricultural potential and land use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58| P a g e  
 
4.2.1 Geographical study area 
 
 
  
Figure 4.2 Map of the Eastern Cape Province 
 
The Amatole District Municipality occupies the central portion of the province, 
boarded by the Eastern Cape districts Cacadu, Chris Hani and OR Tambo, 
respectively to the west, north and east. The district extends over 23,577.11 km 
squared and includes several local municipalities and one Metropolitan (Buffalo City, 
Amahlathi, Nxaba, Nkonkobe, Nqushwa, Great Kei Municipality, Mquma and 
Mbashe Local Municipality), incorporating 21 former magisterial districts. Amatole 
District Municipality includes the former administrative areas of the Eastern Cape, 
namely former Transkei and Ciskei homeland areas and former cape provincial 
areas. According to the Amatole District municipality Integrated Development Plan 
(2011), Amatole district is classified as a category C2 municipality, indicating a 
largely rural character and low urbanisation rate, as well as limited municipal staff 
and budget capacity. Mbhashe, Mquma and Nqushwa are classified as B4 (rural 
mainly subsistence), and Great Kei, Amahlathi, Nkonkobe and Nxhaba as B3 (small 
towns, agricultural) municipalities, reflecting limited institutional capacity and areas 
characterised by small centres, limited Small Medium Micro Entreprises (SMMEs) 
and market opportunities, dependence on public support and LED activities that are 
principally at the level of the small project (Amatole District Municipality Integrated 
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development Plan, 2011). Buffalo city Municipality is the category B1( secondary 
city) municipality in the province, reflecting relatively large budgets and staff, as well 
developed formal business sector and enterprises that have access to market 
supplied business services (Amatole District Municipality Integrated development 
Plan, 2011). The study will be conducted in the rural, urban and peri- urban areas of 
Amatole District Municipality. These are kwezana, Tshatshu peri- urban areas 
around Alice Town and the rural area of Cata. 
 
4.2.2 History of the former homelands of Ciskei 
 
The former homelands were set up by the South African government prior 
independence for Xhosa- speaking people (Wikipedia, 2012). The former Ciskei was 
a Bantustan in the south east of South Africa covered an area of 2,970 square miles, 
most entirely surrounded by what was then the Cape Province, and possessed a 
small coastline along the shore of the Indian Ocean. Under South Africa’s policy of 
apartheid, land was set aside for black people in self- governing territories. The 
former Ciskei was designated as one of two homelands or Bantustan for Xhosa 
speaking people. Xhosa speaker were resettled there and to former Transkei, the 
other Xhosa homeland. The former Ciskei had a succession of capitals during its 
existence. Originally, Zwelitsha served as the capital with the view that Alice would 
become the long- term national capital. However, it was Bisho now spelled Bhisho 
that became the capital until former Ciskei reintegration into South Africa. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the area between the Fish and Kei rivers had 
been set aside for the Bantu and was known as the former Ciskei (Cameroon, 1986). 
The Europeans gave the name former Ciskei to the area to distinguish it from the 
former Transkei, the area north of Kei. In 1961 former Ciskei became a separate 
administrative region and in 1972 was declared a self governing under the rule of 
chief Justice Mbandla and then Lennox Sebe. In 1978 it became a single- party state 
under the rule of Lennox Sebe and in 1981 it became fourth homeland to be 
declared independent by the South African government and its residents lost their 
South African citizenship. However, there were no border- controls between South 
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Africa and former Ciskei. In common with other Bantustans its independence was 
not recognised by the international community. 
 
4.2.3 Demographics  
 
The population of Amatole District is unevenly distributed among seven 
municipalities and metropolitan city. The number of households is 458,582 
(community survey, 2007). According to the Amatole District Municipality Integrated 
development plan (2011), the majority of its population reside within the Buffalo City 
Municipality (42.8%), followed by Mnquma LM (16.4%) and Mbhashe LM (16.1%). 
The two local municipalities with the smallest percentages of the Amatole are Nxuba 
(1.5%) and Great Kei (2.9%). The population density within the Amatole District 
municipality has steadily decreased since 2002. While the population density was 
70.4 people per square kilometre in 2002, it decreased to 69.2 people per square 
kilometre in 2009(Amatole District Municipality Integrated Development Plan, 2011). 
4.2.4 Natural resources 
 
The natural environment of Amatole district Municipality is similarly diverse, including 
moist mountainous, well watered coastal and semi- arid Karoo, thornveld, succulent 
and thick areas. The district includes part of the wild coast and is home to Cwebe 
and Dwesa Nature reserves, and extends inland to include mountainous areas, 
centred on the Amatole mountain range. Amatole is the most diverse district 
municipality in the Eastern Cape. Two- thirds of the district is equally diverse. The 
climate is moderate for most of the year, but with hot periods from December to 
February. Although the area receives rainfall throughout the year, it is primarily a 
summer rainfall region, with the months of June and July being the driest and 
coldest. The mean annual precipitation varies from 1000mm along the coast to 
700mm inland above Butterworth and 1200mm in the Amatole District is 
considerably dryer, with less than 500 mm per annum, than the Eastern side, which 
has rainfall as high as 1000 mm per annum along the coast. 
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4.2.5 Agricultural potential and land use 
 
Agriculture in most part of Amatole district Municipality has not yet developed 
beyond smallholder farming because of constraints facing agricultural areas. The 
prospects of agriculture currently look dim because of the lack of inputs, resources 
and a lack of interest from the youth. The communal farming areas are characterised 
by low technical input, low cost, low yield enterprises with poor infrastructure and 
support services. The agricultural enterprises are very limited in their potential to 
increase the contribution to the Gross Domestic Product of the area due to a number 
of constraints. The Amatole region is characterised by diverse land use and 
ownership linked to natural resources as well as past political systems and 
boundaries. Areas of the homelands are mainly communally owned with high 
population densities. These exist alongside privately owned commercial farmland 
with much higher population densities and very different agri- enterprises. 
Commercial agriculture is characterised but private ownership, larger more viable 
farming units, higher levels of technical input and expertise, higher cost structures, 
higher yields and access to better infrastructure and support systems. 
 
4.3 Melani village 
 
4.3.1 History of Melani village 
 
The village is named after Melani Vela who, together with his followers fought on the 
side of the colonist in the last centuary and in 1866, was granted the land on which 
the village is situated (see figure 4.3 below). At that time 19 families were granted 
residential sites and 19 fields (each of 8 acres) were surveyed and issued as 
Quitrent land. After the group settled in Melani, other people moved into the village 
especially after the 1940s. From the 1960s onwards this situation changed a great 
deal with land scarcity increasing as people settled in the village (Monona, 1997). 
According to De Wet (1987), in 1963 further land shortages resulted from the 
implementation of the betterment scheme which decreased the amount of land 
available to the people. In the late 1960s increasing shortages were experienced in 
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Melani as many landless people from white owned farms I the neighbouring districts 
sought and found residential land in the village. These were destitute people who 
had been evicted from farms or who were not satisfied with farm working or living 
conditions where they were before. Currently, the village population is still growing 
and people from outside were getting residential sites in Melani. 
 
4.3.2 Agriculture and land use  
 
Agriculture in the study area consists of crop production and stock farming under 
dryland conditions and under irrigation in a small government- sponsored project. A 
small percentage of the village residents have access to arable land. Studies 
conducted by Monona (1997), showed that 19 percent of the households in the area 
do not have access to any land, where else the other 30 percent had access to 
Quintrent fields of about 8 percent one morgen-plots.  
 
 
 Figure 4.3 Map of Melani village 
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4.3.3 Battle Dan irrigation scheme 
 
In Melani there is an irrigation scheme named Battle-Dan irrigation scheme which 
consists of 35 ha of land. This scheme started in the 1960s when a small holding 
which belong to the white trader was incorporated into the village was then divided 
into 16 plots which were taken up by residents. These pots are located in an area 
that is closer to a dam. In 1974 the plot holders were motivated by an extension 
officer to use the local dam for irrigation. That was when they took the initiative to 
establish battle- Dan irrigation scheme. Some of the members pointed out that the 
scheme functioned fairly successfully for two years and they were able to produce a 
wide range of vegetables. Thereafter they were not able to access a suitable market 
for their produce, and they started using the land for dry land cultivation.   
After 1994 the department of agriculture had a mandate to revitalised irrigation 
schemes and thus made a provision for irrigation facilities to the scheme. The 
scheme is currently producing citrus fruits, mainly oranges of which they have a 
strategic partner who buys from them at a certain price in bulk and sell it to the 
market. When they have excess produce they sell to local markets including Fruits 
and Veg market in Alice. The scheme has about 32 members who are actively 
involved in the production and has created about 19 jobs for permanent works and 
10 temporary works who are mostly actively involved during picking periods.  
 
4.4 Sampling Procedure 
 
The selected sample comprised irrigation farmers who are involved in the production 
of crops, these farmers will be categorised into homestead food gardeners, 
smallholder irrigation farmers, and or smallholder irrigation schemes in the Amatole 
District Municipality. Open-ended interviews with community leaders and focus 
groups were used to gather information on the ideal location to carry out research 
because of the farming activities taking place in the area. In some cases farmers are 
sparsely populated. Against the foregoing background, a sample of 102 farming 
households was drawn from three places in the former Ciskei “homeland” of South 
Africa, including the Melani, Battlestan and Binfield of the Nkonkobe municipality in 
64| P a g e  
 
the Eastern Cape Province. These three villages were randomly selected from the 
Nkonkobe Municipality.  
 
A total of 75 farmers from each of the two production activities (homestead food 
gardeners and smallholder irrigation farmers) were randomly selected from the 
farming population of Melani, Battlestan and Binfield village. There was no specific 
number of farming households per location because the villages generally share the 
same geographical and institutional setup (Amatole district municipality Integrated 
Development Plan, 2011). 
 
4.4 Data collection methods  
 
Primary data was collected via interviews using questionnaires and situational 
analysis. The field work will commence with a situational analysis of the study area 
to acquire the general information of the Total farming population Random selection 
Sample institutional set-up of the area. Finally, detailed information required in the 
study was gathered using a structured questionnaire. A situational analysis was 
employed in the study to assess the local situation which helped to identify the 
sample population, designing of the questionnaires and feasibility of the study. The 
method will involve an observation of the settlement set-up of the study area. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were principally collected through 
questionnaires. A single-visit household survey using structured questionnaires 
which will cover a wide range of issues, including demographic information, risk 
sources, risk information, and adoption of new agricultural technology within concise 
a broad definition will be employed. Although Bourque and Fielder (2002) assert that 
questionnaires are used to collect data from people who complete the questionnaires 
themselves, the enumerator in this study will use the questionnaires to carry out the 
interviews with farmers. With the help of three enumerators, a total of 
101questionnaires were used to collect data from the sample population. Unlike in a 
posted questionnaire, this interview process ensures direct communication with 
respondents. In this case, there is clarity whenever a question posed to the interview 
is not clear. Information from illiterate respondents is also captured using this 
method. An interview provides the platform to gain cooperation, hence there is 
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minimal loss of information (Leedy and Ormrod, 2004). The method also ensures 
avoidance of spoilt or lost questionnaires. Timely response is also achieved using 
this method. 
 
The data to be captured using questionnaires was utilised for different levels of 
analysis. Firstly, the data were used to describe the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the study area. Secondly, the data was used to 
determine how different factors influence each other. In this regard ordered probit 
analysis and binary logistic regression was employed to identify variables fitted into 
the final model for determining the risk preferences of smallholder irrigation farmers. 
In the latter case (logistic model), four key production variables constituting the 
definition of adoption of technology were identified and each made a response 
variable. These variables are: education and training, household size, farm income 
and land tenure. Lastly, the data was used to find major sources of risk of 
smallholder irrigation farmers and their implication for new agricultural technology 
adoption. To find out key constraints affecting smallholder irrigation farmers, a review 
of the models and variable specifications was done. 
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Table 4.1: Model variables applied in the analyses 
Variables Unit Type of Variable Expected 
sign 
+/- 
Risk  Farmers’ risk attitude Categorical +/- 
Age Actual in years Continuous +/- 
Sex  Sex of the respondent 0 
=female; 1= male 
categorical +/- 
Household Size Actual number Continuous +/- 
Group  Group which respondent 
belong to 0= homestead 
food gardener; 1= 
smallholder farmer 
Categorical  +/- 
Level Of Education 
(Leveledu) 
Attended formal schooling 
or not 
0 = attended school; 1= did 
not attend school 
Categorical + 
Access  to credit 
  
Source of credit 0= other 
;1=bank 
Categorical  + 
Land size 
(Sizeplot) 
Actual size in hectares Continuous +/- 
Land tenure 
(tenuresystem) 
Type of tenure system, 
1=own land ; 0=otherwise  
Categorical +/- 
Occupation  
(Occu) 
Employment status apart 
from farming 0=employed; 
1= unemployed  
Categorical  +/- 
Years of tenure 
(yrsoftnr) 
Number of years in farming Continuous  + 
Livestock damage 
crops 
Farmers perceive it as a 
risk 
0=no risk; 1= riskiness 
Categorical  +/- 
Financial security 
(Finscurty) 
 Farmers financial security 
0= no; 1=yes 
Categorical  +/- 
Information on crop 
production 
(infocrp) 
Information about 
producing crops 
0=no; 1=yes 
Categorical  +/- 
Information on 
markets 
(Infomrkts) 
Information about 
alternative markets 
0=no; 1=yes 
Categorical  +/- 
Ploughing method 
(plghmmthd) 
Method used for ploughing 
crops 
0=hand tools; 1=own 
tractor 
Categorical  +/- 
Source: observations, 2013 
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4.5 Variable specification and definition  
 
The variables examined in the study are presented in Table 4.1. Previous research 
has shown that market access is strongly influenced by such factors as the physical 
conditions of the infrastructure, access to production and marketing equipment, and 
the way the marketing functions are regulated (Killick, Kydd and Poulton, 2000; 
IFAD, 2003 ). 
(i) Age: This variable is expressed as the actual age of the household head in 
years. Previous studies, including Bembridge (1984), have established that 
this variable is a key determinant of behavioural patterns of household and 
community members. Younger farmers are expected to be less willing to take 
risks than older farmers who are perceived to have acquired experience of 
farming and resources. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a higher age is 
negatively related to risk. This is supported by an observation by Obi and Pote 
(2012) that older farmers are likely to have more resources at their disposal, 
which may make them more likely to adopt to technologies more readily than 
younger farmers, despite being less aggressive to seek out more profitable 
markets. In that case, age may be related to the measure risk either positively 
or negatively. 
 
(ii) Sex: This variable is articulated as the sex of the respondent. Studies have 
revealed that the productivity of labour will be altered depending on 
accessibility of the technology between men and women. In many smallholder 
farms, technology is mostly at the disposal of men whereas women contribute 
seventy percent of agricultural production (Lubwana, 1999). According to 
Doss and Morris (2001) there is no significant association between gender 
and technology adoption of improved maize technology among farmers in 
Ghana. In other words sex may or may not have any effect on farmers 
willingness to take risks. 
 
(iii)  Household size: Increase in household size might increase the dependency 
ratio, which in turn affects savings and investment. Conversely, a larger 
household may mean increased labour availability, which enhances farm 
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production under the kind of labour-intensive farming systems that prevail in 
communal agriculture. In turn, increased production increases the chances of 
market access due to larger economies of scale. Therefore, it is possible for 
either positive or negative relationships to exist between risk preference and 
household size. 
 
(iv) Group: Studies have revealed that smallholder farmers as opposed to 
homestead food gardeners tend to be risk takers. Homestead food garderners 
tend to secure food only for household consume, that is they are only 
concerned about food security and are only concerned about thus have no 
aim of profit maximisation where else smallholder are profit driven and tend to 
take risks to improve their produce and there is a possibility of either negative 
or positive relations between risk preferences and group. 
 
(v)  Education level: Studies conducted in several developing countries have 
confirmed the importance of education in the decision-making process with 
implications for the socio-economic development and human capital 
production (Schultz, 1964; Bembridge, 1984; Mushunje, 2005). For the 
agricultural sector, earlier studies equally established that education plays an 
important role in the adoption or otherwise of improved practices in traditional 
agriculture (Bembridge, 1984). The absence of education is therefore 
expected to have a negative influence on these processes. In the light of that, 
it can be hypothesized that there is a positive correlation between education 
and risk preference.  
 
(vi) Years of tenure: This variable measures the number of years a farmer has 
been engaged in farming. It can be hypothesized that the lesser the number 
of years the farmer is involved in farming, the higher the probability of being 
technically constrained because certain farming techniques require that the 
farmer possesses some degree of experience. Thus, there is a positive 
correlation between risk preference and farming experience. 
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(vii) Access to Loans and/or credit:  This variable measures whether farmers 
had access to institutional finance for the facilitation of production. Foltz 
(2005) developed a model that links credit access with agricultural profitability 
and investment in Tunisia. The findings show that credit constraint negatively 
affects farm profitability. As Reardon, Kelly, Crawford, Jayne, Savadogo and 
Clay (1996) have noted, farm profitability depends on availability of markets. It 
can therefore be hypothesized that preference is positively correlated to 
access to production loans and/or credit.  
 
(viii) Land size: This variable refers to the size of land in hectares. Increase in land 
size may enhance production if the land is effectively utilized. At the same 
time, land may be available but not being effectively utilized.  Effective 
utilization will entail application of appropriate farm practices that will lead to 
higher physical output than otherwise would be the case. In the absence of 
more direct means of assessing effectiveness, this can only be inferred from 
the results. Intuitively, one can expect higher output if there is effective 
utilization of available land, and lower output otherwise. It is also reasonable 
to expect that the more physical output a farmer produces, the more surplus is 
marketed. Therefore, it is hypothesized that there is either a positive or a 
negative correlation between risk preference and land size.  
    
(ix) Occupation:  This variable measures whether the farmer is receiving off-farm 
income. Off-farm income can help diminish on-farm technical constraints 
since the farm has alternative capital inputs. Farmers who lack off-farm 
income are less likely to adopt to new agricultural technologies than those 
who have. This is also supported by Mashatola and Darroch (2003). Thus, it 
can be hypothesized that there is a positive correlation between off-farm 
income and risk preferences.   
 
(x) Financial security: This variable defines whether or not the farmers have 
sources and security for credit. 
 
(xi) Information on crop production: This variable explains whether or not 
farmer have acquired information on the effective crop production.  
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(xii) Information on markets: This variable explains whether or not farmers have 
received information on available markets for their produce. 
 
(xiii) Ploughing method: This variable measure the method which is employed to 
plough crops.  
 
(xiv) Water rate: The variable measures the amount which is paid for water by the 
farmers. 
 
(xv) Irrigation system: This variable measures the method which is used to 
irrigate crops. 
 
4.6 Data analysis model 
 
4.6.1The probit model  
 
This section presents the background to the probit model as well as the 
mathematical representation of the model. The probit model is used to identify the 
determinants of farmers’ decision to take risk. 
 
4.6.1.1 Introduction and application of the model  
 
Multiple response models are used when the number of alternatives that can be 
chosen is more than two. They are developed to describe the probability of each of 
the possible outcomes as a function of personal or alternative specific characteristics 
(Verbeek, 2008). Ordered response models are applied where there exists an 
ordered or logical ordering of the alternatives. In this case it is assumed that there 
exists an underlying latent variable that drives the choice between the alternatives 
(Verbeek. 2008). The results in this case will be sensitive to the way in which the 
alternatives are numbered. The modelling methodology used to establish the 
determinants of the farmers risk preference status is the ordered probit model.  
 
The ordered probit is suitable for modelling with a categorical dependent variable (in 
this study the risk preference status). Multivariate modelling is an especially useful 
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and informative approach to understanding the farmer‘s decision on their risk 
preference status. This is because multiple factors contribute to their decision on 
whether to take risk or not. Ordered probit is especially appropriate in this study 
because like Ordinary Least Square (OLS) it identifies the statistical significant 
relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. BUT 
unlike the OLS regression, ordered probit discerns unequal differences between 
ordinal categories in the dependent variable (McKelvey and Zavonia, 1975; Greene, 
2003).  
 
4.6.1.2 Mathematical representation of the ordered probit model  
 
In this study, the dependent variable of the risk preference status was placed in two 
ordered categories in the survey. An ordered probit model is used to determine the 
factors that influence a farmer‘s riskiness. Based on the review of literature, the 
model is estimated as follows  
 
(1) farmers’ riskiness = f (age, sex, education, household size, land tenure, location,  
risk attitudes, type of plot, tenure system, ploughing method, irrigation system, 
financial security, livestock damage crops, uncertainty in climate, source of water, 
water rate, paying water)   
 
The farmer‘s decision on their risk preferences is unobserved and is denoted by the 
latent variable si*. The latent equation below models how si* varies with personal 
characteristics and is represented as:  
 
An Ordered Probit model was used to meet the objective. The model is shown as 
follows: 
 
y i *= β' xi + εi = i,   ε ~ N[0,1]------------------------------------------------------------(8)   
yi = 0 if  yi * ≤ μ0 
yi = 1 if yi * ≤ μ1 
yi = 2 if yi * ≤ μ2 
 
Where: 
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 yi* is the observed counterpart of yi* , 
 β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated,  
x i  is the matrix of independent variables, 
 μj is the distance variable and  
εi is the error term.  
The variance of error term is assumed to be 1.00 (Greene, 2000). 
 
 
The ordinal variable y i is defined to take a value of j if y i* falls in the j th category: 
y = j if ξ j− < y *< ξ j1 j =1,…, 
 J where ξ ' s are unknown threshold parameters that must be estimated along with β 
assuming ξ −1 = −∞ , ξ 0 = 0 and ξ j = ∞ .  
 
The probability of obtaining an observation with y = j is equal to Pr ob(y = j) = F(ξ j − 
β ′x) − F(ξ j−1 − β ′x)  
where F is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
 
The effect of the independent variable on the probability of the j th level is given by:∂ 
Pr ob( y = j) / ∂x =β [f (ξ j−1 −β ′x) − f (ξ j −β ′x)]  
where f is the standard normal density function (Tansel, 2002). The following model 
was estimated by using maximum likelihood method to have consistent and efficient 
parameter estimates.  
 
4.7 Multinomial logistic regression model 
 
The multinomial logistic regression model was used to test the different levels of 
risks, namely no risk, minor risk and severe risk as perceived by farmers in the area.  
Multinomial logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable, based 
on continuous and/or categorical independent variables, where the dependent 
variable takes more than two forms (Hill, Griffiths and Judge, 2001). Furthermore, it 
is used to determine the percent of variance in the dependent variable explained by 
the independent variables and to rank the relative importance of independent 
variables. Logistic regression does not assume linear relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variables, but requires that the independent 
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variables be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable (Gujarati, 1992). 
Pundo and Fraser (2006) explained that the model allows for the interpretation of the 
logit weights for the variables in the same way as in linear regression. 
The model has been chosen because it allows one to analyse data where 
participants are faced with more than two choices. In this study, smallholder farmers 
are faced with three choices, which are; no risk, minor risk and severe risk. Firstly, 
the farmers are assumed to decide whether they perceive a certain issue as minor 
risk, severe risk and/or no risk.  
4.7.1 Mathematical representation of the model 
 
As such, the utility maximizing function can be given as: 
Max U = U (Ck, Rfk, Rik; Hu) ............................................................................ (9) 
 
Where: Max U denotes the maximum utility that can be attained from agricultural 
production.  
Ck represents the sex, education, household size, land tenure, location,  risk 
attitudes, type of plot, tenure system, ploughing method, irrigation system, financial 
security, livestock damage crops, uncertainty in climate, source of water, water rate, 
paying water… 
 
From the utility maximizing function, it can be seen that households make decisions 
to produce, consume and market, subject to risk factors. It follows that if the costs 
that are associated with using a particular channel are greater than the benefits, 
households will be discouraged from using it, shifting to another option that 
maximizes their utility.  
O’ Sullivan, Sheffrin and Perez (2006) pointed out that it is difficult to measure utility 
directly; therefore, it is assumed that households make participation choices 
depending on the option that maximizes their utility. Thus, decisions to participate in 
either formal or informal markets or even not participating signify the direction, which 
maximizes utility. With the given assumption, multinomial regression was used to 
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relate the decisions to participate in formal markets, informal markets or not 
participating and the factors that influence these choices. 
A typical logistic regression model, which was be used is of the form: 
 Logit (Pi) = ln (Pi / 1 – Pi) = α + β1X1 + …+ βnXn + Ut ..................................................  (10) 
 
Where: ln (Pi / 1 – Pi) = logit for market participation choices 
Pi = denotes the mean  
            1-Pi = the variance 
  β = coefficient 
X represents covariates 
Ut = error term 
4.8 Justification of the econometric model 
 
Multinomial logistic regression model is useful in analysing data where the 
researcher is interested in finding the likelihood of a certain event occurring. In other 
words, using data from relevant independent variables, multinomial logistic 
regression is used to predict the probability (p) of occurrence, not necessarily getting 
a numerical value for a dependent variable (Gujarati, 1992). Dougherty (1992) 
explained that the procedure for formulating a multinomial logistic regression model 
is the same as for a binary logistic regression. Whereas in binary logistic regression, 
the dependent variable has two categories, in multinomial logistic regression, it has 
more than two categories. Thus, multinomial logistic regression is an extension of 
binary logistic regression. 
According to Mohammed and Ortmann (2005), several methods can be used to 
explain the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Such 
methods include linear regression models, probit analysis, log-linear regression and 
discriminant analysis. However, multinomial logistic regression has been chosen 
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because it has more advantages, especially when dealing with qualitative dependent 
variables. 
Linear regression model (also known as Ordinary least squares regression (OLS)) is 
the most widely used modelling method for data analysis and has been successfully 
applied in most studies (Montshwe, 2006). However, Gujarati (1992) pointed out that 
the method is useful in analysing data with a quantitative (numerical) dependent 
variable but has a tendency of creating problems if the dependent variable is 
qualitative (categorical), as in this study. Amongst other problems, the OLS cannot 
be used in this study because it can violate the fact that the probability has to lie 
between 0 and 1, if there are no restrictions on the values of the independent 
variables. On the other hand, multinomial logistic regression guarantees that 
probabilities estimated from the logit model will always lie within the logical bounds 
of 0 and 1 (Gujarati, 1992). In addition, OLS is not practical because it assumes that 
the rate of change of probability per unit change in the value of the explanatory 
variable is constant.  With logit models, probability does not increase by a constant 
amount but approaches 0 at a slower rate as the value of an explanatory variable 
gets smaller. 
When compared to log-linear regression and discriminant analysis, logistic 
regression proves to be more useful. Log-linear regression requires that all 
independent variables be categorical and discriminant analysis requires them all to 
be numerical, but logistic regression can be used when there is a mixture of 
numerical and categorical independent variables (Dougherty, 1992). In addition, 
discriminant analysis assumes multivariate normality, and this limits its usage 
because the assumption may be violated (Klecka, 1980). According to Gujarati 
(1992), probit analysis gives the same results as the logistic model. In this study, the 
logistic model is preferred because of its comparative mathematical simplicity and 
fewer assumptions in theory.  Moreover, logistic regression analysis is more 
statistically robust in practice, and is easier to use and understand than other 
methods. 
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4.8 Chapter summary 
 
The study area is the former Ciskei in the Eastern Cape Province. Rural Eastern 
Cape Province where the study was conducted has high concentration of people 
who are relatively poor and population resides in communal areas of the former 
Ciskei homelands. These are characterised by smallholders who rely on subsistence 
agriculture as an important livelihood option, contributing a significant portion of their 
household income. Questionnaires are used to collect data from 101 smallholder 
farmers and the econometric models probit and multinomial models were methods 
used for analysis are outlined in the text. The researcher decided to iterate with 
alternative functional forms due to the fact that no study with the exact same problem 
context exists and the researcher is still trying to explain the apparent incongruity of 
the failure to transform despite positive and favourable policy and investment 
environment at the national and provincial level.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses of the survey data on Risk 
preferences of farmers. The data collected for this chapter were derived from 
interviews with the heads of the household drawn from for the two farmer groups in 
the study area. Quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to gather and 
evaluate the data in order to gain deeper understanding of farmers’ management 
decisions and perceptions on risk. The chapter begins with the presentation of 
summary statistics of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
smallholder farmers. Quantitative variables were expressed as averages, whereas 
the gender and literacy dummy variables were reported as frequencies and 
percentages. The probit and multinomial results for the determinants of risk 
preferences are analysed and discussed. 
 
 5.2 Description of demographic factors   
 
5.2.1 Description of Household Size 
 
Table 5.1 represents the total number of the respondents in the study area was 101, 
that is, 63 were homestead food gardeners and 38 smallholder irrigators. The mean 
household size for homestead food gardeners was found to be 4 family members 
and 5 members for smallholder irrigators. The median for the two groups was found 
to be the same which is 5 and the maximum number of homestead food gardeners’ 
household members is 13 and the minimum being 1 and for smallholder irrigators the 
maximum is 10 members and a minimum of 2 members. The household size is a 
proxy for family labour which is one of the most important inputs to smallholder farm 
production. The availability of family labour especially during peak labour demand is 
important for households that have adopted new agricultural technology that is 
labour intensive. On the other hand large family sizes also put pressure on 
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household food demands and hence has implications for the adoption of agricultural 
technologies that have a bearing on food security and/or commercialization for 
income sources.  
 
 Table 5.1 Household size of respondents 
 
5.2.2 Description of Household by Sex  
 
Figure 5.1 Shows both results of homestead food gardeners and smallholder 
irrigators males dominate in homestead food gardens represented by 63%, whereas 
females dominated in smallholder irrigators with 52%. 
 
    
Figure 5.1 Sex distributions of the respondents, Survey data, 2013 
 
5.2.3 Description of household by Age  
 
Figure 5.2  shows that the homestead food gardeners have the youngest individuals 
involved in farming who are around 20- 29 years and also the oldest age between 81 
and above. Furthermore, the results indicate that the age distribution from 70-79 is 
  Smallholder n= 38 Homestead n=63 Overall 
Mean  5 4 5 
Median 5 4 5 
Maximum 13 10 13 
Minimum 1 2 1 
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similar between the two groups. Kirsten and Jerkins (2003) and Adesina and Baidu- 
Forson (1999) established that age was either significant or was negatively related to 
adoption. Older farmers, because of investing several years in a particular practice, 
may not want to jeopardise it by trying out a completely new method. Farmers’ 
perception that technology development and subsequent benefits, require a lot of 
time to realise, can reduce their interest in the new technology because of their 
advanced age, and the possibility of not living to enjoy it 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Age of household respondents, survey data 2013 
 
5.2.4 Description of Household by Education 
 
The level of education was divided into two segments which are Formal education 
and no formal education. This is one of the important characteristics because the 
higher the educational level the easier for the respondents to adopt and use modern 
technology since they understand technology better. Moreover the flow of agriculture 
information from one stakeholder to another is easier. Figure 5.3 below clearly 
indicates the education system received by farmers in the study. 90% homestead 
food farmers have received formal education, wherelse 3 % of smallholder irrigation 
farmers have never received formal education. A large percentage of smallholder 
irrigation farmers in the area seems to have received formal education, hence the 
97%. In both homestead food gardening and smallholder irrigation farming a large 
percentage has received formal education.  
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Figure 5.3: Education level of the respondents, survey data, 2013 
 
5.2.5 Description of household by Occupation  
 
In this study the occupation category of the respondents is divided into retired, 
unemployed and self employed. The respondents have got more retired respondents 
of about 7 % and 57% of the respondents are self employed. About 21% of the 
respondents are employed elsewhere and hence have non farming income. 
Occupation of the respondents is very crucial since income they earn helps the 
respondents to achieve household food security. To some degree, income is also 
used to purchase food, clothes and other (Muregerera, 2003). 
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Figure 5.4 Occupation of the respondents, survey data, 2013 
 
5.2.6. Description of household by Income 
 
From the figure below clearly indicates that both smallholders and homestead food 
gardeners are earning slightly above R1500, this could be because some of the 
respondents are pensioners, who are eligible to the pension funds, and others may 
be having other sources of income, and a very low percentage of the farmers are 
earning above R1500. Both smallholders and homestead food gardeners have the 
same income of about R500. Access to cash which promotes adoption of risky 
technologies through the relaxation of liquidity constraints as well as boosts the 
household’s risk bearing ability is hardly available to resource poor farmers for varied 
reasons (Langyintuo and lowenberg, 2006). Farm income may affect adoption 
negatively or positively depending on its contribution to household income and farm 
profitability. Farmers with more wealth and liquidity maybe better able to finance the 
adoption of new technologies and farming practices (Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001). 
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Figure 5.5 Income of respondents, survey data, 2013 
 
5.3 Land use  
5.3.1 Number of years farming 
 
A vast majority of homestead food gardeners have been farming for over 16 years as 
compared to the smallholder’s irrigation farmers whose majority of farmers have 
been farming between 6 to 10 years. Moreover the homestead food gardeners 
seems to have been in farming for more years as seen in figure 5.7 where 
smallholder farmers have been farming for not more than 10 years. The number of 
years in farming is very important in depicting the experience that a farmer has and 
also in determining whether or not a farmer can easily adopt to new agricultural 
technology.  
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Figure 5.6 Number of year in farming, survey data, 2013 
 
5.3.2 Land tenure system used by the farmers 
 
The figure below illustrates the type of tenure system used by the farmers in the 
study area. About half of the farmers in the study area have their own land making it 
easier for them to continue with their farming activities and also the willingness to 
take risk. However a slightly lower percentage of about 40 % are using communal 
lands and this is has a negative impact on the willingness to take risks and the 
adoption of new agricultural technology. If farmers perceive their tenure as secure, 
they have an incentive to invest in land improvements and maintain existing 
improvements to increase productivity. However, policies such as the land reform 
process play a role in finding solutions for problems associated with limited access to 
land.  
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Figure 5.7 Land tenure system of the respondents, survey data, 2013 
5.3.3 Land Size 
 
The size of land a farmer owns is usually associated with the amount of produce the 
farmers will produce even though it’s not always the case since most farmers might 
not utilise all the land that they have been allocated (Muchingura, 2007). Najafi 
(2003) also goes on to say that land size is also an important aspect when it comes 
to the food security of household and thus the bigger the land the bigger the 
production. The average land size obtained in the sample is 1.5 ha there is a 
difference of about a hectar between the two groups on the land sizes and they 
ranged from 0.25 to 10 ha.  
 
Table 5.2: Size of land utilised by respondents 
  Smallholder n=38 Homestead n=63 
Mean 2.27 0.25 
Std. 
Deviation 1.48 1.73 
Minimum 0.25 4 
Maximum 8 10 
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5.4 Water use 
5.4.1 Source of water 
 
The main sources of water in the former Ciskei homelands of the Eastern Cape are 
dams, rivers, taps and boreholes. A high percentage of farmers in the area are using 
water from the dams as most of them are surrounded by dams, however they do not 
have water rights. Only 4% of the farmers use water from borehole and 155 uses 
water from taps which are communal taps.   
 
Figure 5.8 Sources of water used by the respondents, survey data, 2013 
5.4.2 Type of irrigation system  
 
The most commonly used method of irrigation are water cans which are used mostly 
by homestead food gardeners,38% of the farmers uses sprinklers which are mainly 
used by smallholder irrigation farmers. Other irrigation systems include drip irrigation 
systems and pivots which are also used in the area. This is illustrated in figure 5.9 
below 
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Figure 5.9 type of irrigation system of the respondents, survey data, 2013 
 
 
5.5 Livelihood strategies  
 
5.5.1 Cash borrowed 
 
Table 4.5 below reflects the amount of money borrowed both smallholder farmers 
and homestead food gardeners. Over 70 % of the farmers have borrowed money 
between R1 and R500.  Atleast 1% of the respondents have borrowed money from 
R2501 and R2000; this could be influenced by the fact that most of the farmers are 
self employed.   
Table 5.3: The amount of money borrowed 
Amount 
Borrowed Frequency Percentage 
1- 500 78 77.2 
5001-1000 11 10.9 
1001-1500 4 4 
1501-2000 1 1 
2001-2500 7 6.9 
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5.5.2 Purpose of credit  
 
Although farmers may have access to informal credit, they have a number of issues 
they are using it for. This study has discovered that many of the farmers in Ciskei 
borrow money for the main purpose of family suppose and this is reflected by the 
70% in the graph below. 
 
Figure 5.10 Main purposes for credit, survey data, 2013 
 
5.5.3 Source of credit 
 
For smallholder farmers access to credit is vital to any production, especially for 
commercial purposes. This both credit to obtain assets over a longer period and 
production credit cyclical basis (May and Carter, 2009).Both homestead food 
gardeners and smallholder farmers outsource their credit from lenders and just a 
small percentage of these farmers get their loans from banks. This can have a 
negative impact on risk and the adoption of new agricultural technology. 
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Figure 5.11 Sources of credit, survey data, 2013 
 
5.5.4 Financial security 
 
Figure 5.12 below illustrate whether or not farmers in the study area have financial 
security or not. Over 70 percent of the respondents do not have financial security, 
making it difficult for them to access credit and thus more risk averse and less willing 
to adopt to new agricultural technology. 
 
Figure 5.12 Financial securities of the respondents, survey data, 2013 
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5.6. Empirical Analysis 
5.6.1 Determinants of risk: Probit results 
 
The probit model successfully estimated the significant variables associated with the 
farmers’ risk perception. The following variables were found to be significant 
determinants in the farmers decision to take risk in the study area: sex, age, 
occupation, type of plot, size of plot(land), tenure system, years in tenure, source of 
water (water accessibility), water rate and irrigation system. A positive and significant 
relationship between risk and sex depict that male farmers are at lower risk aversion 
as compared to their female counterparts, however studies by kisaka- lwayo (2005) 
did not observe any gender differences in risk propensity towards ‘contextual’ 
decisions and concluded that gender stereotype may not reflect male and female 
attitudes toward risks. Experiments have shown that context matters in relation to 
gender differences and risk attitudes (Schubert et al., 1999). 
 
 Age is significant indicating that older farmers tend to be more willing to take risk. 
While this is not consistent with findings in most extension studies, in the study area, 
the average age of the farmers is over 49 years. Similar findings have been recorded 
by Matungul (2001). Farming in the study area and many rural areas of South Africa 
is undertaken by older farmers as the younger members of the household migrate to 
urban areas in search for jobs. Farming in many instances is also considered as an 
alternative option to retirement from wage employment. A similar relationship 
between risk and the age of the farmer was found by Hossain et al. (1992) who 
revealed that the probability of taking risk increased with age among farmers in 
Bangladesh. Similarly in China, Feng and Chenqi (2010) established in their study 
on Sustainable Agricultural Technologies (SAT) that the adoption of SAT is higher 
among older farmers than younger farmers. This is probably due to previous 
knowledge gained as these were earlier technologies introduced in Northern China 
and hence farmers had more experience in using them.  
 
Occupation i.e. non-farm income is significant and this is due to the fact that farmers 
who have other income apart from the farm are more willing to take risk or are less 
risk averse. This is supported by studies by Kisaka-Lwayo (2005) in Kwazulu-Natal 
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where income was found to be negatively correlated to risk aversion. Type and size 
of plot were found to be significant to risk due to the fact that farmers tend take risk 
when there is enough resources available for them and thus if there is enough land 
available they adopt to new technologies. However cultivating more land could be a 
risk coping strategy for the risk averse, but as most of the farmers in the study area  
resource poor, more land means more resources to be allocated to farming and 
hence this may tend to create less willingness to take risk. 
 
The tenure system (land tenure) security of the farmers is statistically significant. 
This implies when farmers have security of land tenure the tendency to risk is higher. 
The farmer‘s perception of tenure security was assessed by the rights the household 
can exercise on his/her own cropland by building structures. However it should be 
noted that in the study area, land ownership is customary and farmers have 
permission to occupy. A study undertaken by Smucker, White and Bannister (2000) 
on land tenure and the adoption of agricultural technology in Haiti found that formal 
title is not necessarily more secure than informal arrangements. Informal 
arrangements based on traditional social capital resources assure affordable and 
flexible access to land for most people. The perceived stability of access to land via 
stability of personal and social relationships is a more important determinant of 
technology adoption than mode of access. 
 
The years of tenure are significant because the more experienced farmers are more 
willing to take risk as compared to less experienced farmers as they seem to have 
more knowledge farming. Water rate and source of water are significant and 
positively related to risk because of the availability of water in the study area as the 
area is surrounded by rivers and dams, although they may need water rights and 
good irrigation systems. Information on crop production is positive and significant 
and this indicates that farmers in the study area have indigenous knowledge on crop 
production and may also receive it from the extension officers.  
 
Risk preferences could be explained by individual psychological factors and it may 
be important to estimate individual risk preferences or identify factors that affect the 
individual’s capacity to bear risk or consider their risk environment. 
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Table 5.4 Socio- economic statistics variables, Eastern Cape 
Variable  Std. error Z Significan
ce 
HHSIZE 0.024 -0.470 0.638 
SEX 0.112 3.127 0.002** 
AGE 0.004 -3.510 0.000*** 
LEVELEDU 0.160 0.664 0.507 
OCCU 0.119 -5.117 0.000*** 
TYPEPLOT .135 -6.303 0.000*** 
SIZEPLOT .037 -10.046 0.000*** 
TENURESYSTEM .102 -5.805 0.000*** 
YRSOFTNR .008 -19.445 0.000*** 
SOURCEH2O .119 3.932 0.000*** 
H2ORATE .016 -6.289 0.000*** 
H20PAYING .732 6.023 0.000*** 
IRRIGATIONSYSTEM .135 -5.841 0.000*** 
FINCLSCURTY .092 -0.082 0.935 
CLMTUNCRTN .093 -.0204 0.838 
INFOCRP .111 4.105 0.000*** 
INFOMRKTS .105 -3.339 0.001** 
PLGHNGMTHD .125 -4.413 0.000*** 
INTERCEPT .394 0.543 0.587 
Goodness- of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 5.084E+037 77 .000 
Source: results from SPSS version 21, where, ***, ** represents statistical significance at 10% 
and 5% respectively. 
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5.6.2 Determinants of Risk preferences: Multinomial results  
 
There is a positive and significant relationship between household size and farmers 
who perceive farming as severe risk. This finding supports the interpretation that a 
larger family size implies higher subsistence consumption needs and aversion to 
risk. Hollaway et al. (2002) had a similar result and interpreted it as a confirmation 
that higher subsistence pressure leads to greater adoption of new agricultural 
technology aimed at improving food access among households. Feinermann and 
Finkelshtain (1996) found that larger family size leads to more cautious and 
conservative behaviour, while Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) found that farmers with 
larger households were less risk averse. The potential to meet peak labour demand 
also highlights the importance of the availability of family labour. 
 
Water rate is significant and positively related to risk. This could be because farmers 
who perceive farming as severe risk are mostly residing in areas which are far from 
rivers and dams and are unable to easily access water. Irrigation system is also 
positively and significant to farmers who perceive farming as risky, these is because 
most of these farmers do not have sufficient and efficient irrigation systems for a 
good production. 
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Table 5.5 Risk attitudes of farmers in the former Ciskei homelands, Eastern 
Cape 
Source: results from SPSS version 21, where, ***, ** represents statistical significance at 10% and 5% 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE Minor risk Severe risk 
B  Std. 
error  
Significa
nce  
B  Std. 
error 
Significance  
INTERCEPT -3.015 2.089 0.149 2.093 2.380 0.379 
HHSIZE 0.083 0.149 0.580 -0.340 0.182 0.061* 
SEX -.012 0.641 0.986 0.470 0.739 0.525 
AGE 0.039 0.023 .0094 -0.016 0.027 0.542 
LEVELEDU 0.984 0.959 0.305 1.600 1.331 0.229 
SURCEH2O 0.388 0.672 0.564 -0.422 0.807 0.601 
H2ORATE 0.027 0.022 0.221 0.083 0.026 0.002** 
IRRIGATION
SYSTEM 
-0.208 0.709 0.769 -2.428 1.043 0.020* 
FINCLSCURT
Y 
-0.733 0.681 0.282 -1.207 0.799 0.131 
INFOMRKTS -0.131 0.630 0.835 -0.781 0.689 0.257 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 188.877 182 0.348 
Deviance 166.019 182 0.796 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
In summary smallholder farmers risk preferences is dependent on a number of 
factors, such as age, income, occupation, water rate, irrigation systems etc. hence 
this also has an effect on the adoption of new agricultural technology. They are also 
different farming systems that the farmers use and they have access to land, 
although they is limited access to inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. 
Both groups are willing to take risks. The probit model successfully estimated the 
significant variables associated with the farmer‘s adoption decisions and these are: 
age, sex, tenure system, years of tenure and water rate. The multinomial logit also 
proved the significance of water rate, irrigation system and the importance of 
household size in decision making. The study also found that older farmers tend to 
be adopters supporting findings by Feng and Chenqi (2010). 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the study and concludes on the basis 
of the findings derived from the descriptive analysis and the empirical results. It 
discusses the extent to which objectives and hypotheses posed at the beginning of 
the study have been addressed by the analysis. Furthermore it also generates the 
recommendations on the basis of the results. 
 
6.2. Summary 
 
The summary contextualizes the study by highlighting the state of agriculture, 
agricultural technology adoption, risk and risk management. Furthermore, it also 
gives an overview of the methodology used in the study and the results. The results 
highlight the outcome of analysis for the various models. These establish the 
determinants of risk and risk management by smallholder farmers and homestead 
food gardeners. The recommendation of the study outlines the policy implications 
and areas for further studies. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
 
Today, Africa appears to have a monopoly on poverty and hunger. New technologies 
and access to seeds and inputs and better management practices are critical to 
changing this situation, but they are by no means sufficient. To unlock the potential 
of smallholder farmers to fight hunger and food insecurity, and to bring prosperity, 
these innovations must reach farmers. Investment in research and technology 
development is critical in transforming Africa's agriculture. From the summary 
findings presented above policy proposals, recommendations and areas for further 
research are presented below. 
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6.4 Recommendations 
 
The farmers can also adapt to the use of draught power for ploughing and 
transporting goods from the field to their homes or the markets. This will help reduce 
costs of hiring a tractor since it is generally expensive and impossible for some 
farmers to hire tractor due to lack of funds. Despite the costs, they are few tractors 
available for high meaning that they cannot cater for the high demand in tractor use, 
in other words this makes draught power a better option. Furthermore the researcher 
recommends that farmers can have more access to market information so that they 
can be able to sell they produce at the current prices and also to be able to know the 
products that are one demand. 
 
6.5. Policy implications 
 
This study sought to identify among others, independent variables that explain the 
risk preferences and thereby facilitate policy prescriptions to augment adoption in 
South Africa and around the world. Risk is an independent variables used in the 
probit analysis revealed some underlying patterns of influence. Given the limited 
prospect of identifying such variables through further research, it is concluded that 
efforts to promote technology adoption will have to be tailored to reflect the particular 
conditions of individual locales. The propensity of adoption decisions by 
neighbourhoods to affect others must be given due importance, for price marketing, 
extension delivery and development purposes, while delineating target domains for 
introducing new technologies especially where resources are limited. An insight into 
the sources of risk has clear implications as to how the perceived riskiness may be 
reduced, thus increasing the likelihood that relatively more risk averse farmers will 
adopt new agricultural technology. 
  
Nevertheless, the adoption of farming technologies, productivity and growth is a 
dynamic process that requires persistent research and development programmes. 
Therefore to maintain and further improve productivity and growth, there should be 
continued investment in agricultural research aimed at generating new and 
improving old technologies that could shift the production frontiers and improve the 
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efficiency of input use. Research and development programmes can be undertaken 
by Government, development agencies and or research institutions. This will provide 
a basis for knowledge dissemination and documentation.  
 
Identified sources of risk faced by smallholder farmers provide useful insights for 
policy makers, advisers, developers and sellers of risk management strategies. This 
information can yield substantial payouts in terms of the development of quality farm 
management and education programs as well as the design of more effective 
government policies. New technologies and rural development programs need to be 
tailored to the risk attitudes of a particular group of farmers if they are going to be 
effective. Due to the unwillingness nature of these smallholder farmers, policy 
makers need to develop strategies that enable them better manage and reduce risk 
while mitigating against the identified sources of risk.  
 
Some of the sources of risk were common across the farmer groups. These include 
the uncertain climate and lack of cash and credit to finance inputs. This shows that 
communication and joint-problem solving may help to address some of the 
challenges. Investment in water harvesting technologies will ensure availability of 
water throughout the growing season and alleviate the risk associated with drought. 
Agricultural credit should be extended to farmers through service cooperatives and 
extension programmes. Input credit should be widely applied to enable farmers 
adopt improved agricultural technologies. 
  
While lack of liquidity may remain a risk in the short and medium-term for rural 
farmers, alternative sources of fund need to be considered through lobbying 
government to assist with legislation on the acceptance of Permission to Occupy 
(PTO) documentation as legitimate proof of ownership. Farmers can also access 
credit through Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) that funds 
cooperatives and other legally registered farming organizations. Upgrading storage 
facilities should start at farm level to retail level to increase the shelf life of the 
produce and also ensure price stability. Improving the efficiency of the distribution 
channels and forward linkages will result in better turn around time for payment.  
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Contract farming will limit the risk associated with unreliable market and prices for 
producers while buyers will have a guaranteed supply of organic produce. More 
information on market and consumer preferences would enable the farmers better 
understand how to meet market demand. It is important to note that while information 
on organic production and marketing are readily available at the Department of 
Agriculture, South Africa and on the internet through various economic bureaus, the 
challenge remains accessibility, packaging and dissemination to smallholder 
farmers. This could be addressed through the use of extension agents, farmer field 
days and forums for information exchange.  Supplementary policy interventions that 
are aimed at improving access to credit and markets will reduce poverty and impact 
on risk behaviour of farm households. In the long run, broad based economic 
development including the development of credit an insurance markets is the most 
certain way to correct the existing imperfections and reduce the level of risk aversion 
among farmers. There is also a need for the development and investment in new 
technical packages which enable yield to withstand unexpected changes in weather 
condition and are highly reliable in on-farm practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99| P a g e  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abdulai, A. Owusu, V. and Bakang, J.E.A. (2011). Adoption of safer irrigation 
technologies and cropping patterns: Evidence from Southern Ghana. Working 
paper No. 11. Department of Food Economics and Consumption Studies, 15: 
30- 43. 
Adams, M., Sibanda, S and Turner, S. (1999) ‘Land tenure reform and rural 
livelihoods in Southern Africa’, Natural Resource Perspectives, Number 39, 
ODI. 
Adebusuyi, B.S. (2004). Stabilisation of commodity market of interest to Africa. 
Paper presented at the workshop on constraints  to growth in sub- Saharan 
Africa. Intergovernmental Group of Twenty- four in Pretoria, South Africa. 12-
16 November. 
Adesina, A.A. and Baidu- Forson, J. (1995). Farmers perception and adoption of new 
agricultural technology: evidence from analysis in Burkina Furso and Guinea, 
West Africa. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 13:1-9. 
Adesina,  A.A. and Brorsen, B.W. (1987). A risk acreage response function for millet 
in Niger. Agricultural economics, 1:229- 239. 
Adesina, A.A., and Ouattara A.D. (2000). Risk and Agricultural Systems in Northerm 
Côte d'Ivoire. Agricultural Systems 66, 17-32.  
Aliber M and Hart T.G.B. (2009).―Should Subsistence Agriculture be Supported as 
a Strategy to Address Rural Food Insecurity? Agrekon, Vol 48, No 4 . 
Aliber M., and Hall R. (2009).The case for re-strategizing spending priorities to 
support small-scale farmers in South Africa‖, IDASA Conference, 
‗Governance and Small-scale Agriculture in South Africa‘ 9-11 November 
2009. 
100| P a g e  
 
Aliber et al.,(2009). Strategies to support South African smallholders as a 
contribution to government’s second economy strategy: Situation analysis, 
Research report 41, Volume 1: fieldwork findings and main conclusions, 
Published by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, School of 
Government, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of 
the Western Cape, South Africa.  
Aliber M., and Maluleke T., (2010).The role of ―black capital‖ in revitalising land 
reform in Limpopo, South Africa‖, Law, Democracy & Development, Vol 14 
(2010) 2 Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), University 
of the Western Cape, South Africa. 
Alderman H. (2008). Managing risks to increase risks efficiency and reduce poverty. 
World Development Report 2008, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Alderman, H. and Pixson, C. (1994). Could the poor insure? A synthesis of the 
literature on risk and consumption in ddeveloping countries. Proceedings of 
the 10th world congress of International Economic Association, Moscow 
August 28- 31. 
Alene A.D., Manyong V.M., Omanya G., Mignouna H.D., Bokanga M., Odhiambo G 
(2008). Smallholder market participation under transaction costs: Maize 
supply and fertilizer demand in Kenya. Food Policy 33: 318-328. 
Anderson, J.R. and  Dillon J.L. (1992). Risk Analysis in Dryland Farming Systems. 
Farming Systems Management Series No. 2, FAO, Rome. 
Anderson, J. R., Dilon J.L. and Hardker, J.B. (1985). Farmers and risk. Paper 
presented at the XIX International Conference of Agricultural Economics. 
Theoretical developments: Farm management and organisation. 26 August- 4 
Septermber, Milago Spain.crop production: Future challenges. Development 
Southern Africa, 8: 479-493. 
Annual Meeting, (2003). Durban, South Africa, International Association of 
Agricultural Economists Guy Blaise Ngassam Nkamleu, Jim Gokowski and 
Harounan Kazianga August 16-22. 
101| P a g e  
 
          Arrow, K. (1965). Aspect of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Yrj¨o Jahnsson Foundation, 
Helsinki 
Arrow, K.J. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
 
Babcock, B.A. Choi, K. and Feinerman, E. (1993).risk and probability premiums for 
CARA utility functions. Agrekon. Iowa. 
 
Backeberg, G.R (2006) Water institutional reforms in South Africa. Water Pol. 7 107-
123. 
Banerjee, A.V. and Ghatak, M. (2004). Eviction threats and investment incentives. 
Journal of Development Economics, 74: 469- 488. 
Barrett, C. B. (2008), "The Economics Of Poverty Traps And Persistent Poverty: 
Policy And Empirical Implications," 30 July 2012 revised version. 
Bar-Shira, Z., Just, R.E., and Zilberman, D.() “Estimation of Farmers Risk Attitude: 
An Econometric Approach,” Agricultural Economics 17 (1997):211-222. 
 
Beal, D.J.(1996). Emerging issues in risk management in farm firms. Review of 
marketing and Agricultural Economics, 64:336- 347. 
 Belaineh, L. (2002). Risk Responses of smallholder Farmers in the Eastern 
Highlands of Ethiopia. Mimeograph. 
Belaineh, L. (2000). Smallholders' risk perception and coping strategies: The case of 
Kersa and Babile, Eastern Ethiopia. Published MSc. Thesis. ISSN 1403-7998. 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Rural 
Development Studies, Uppsala 
Belaineh, L and Drake, L.(2002). Determinants of Smallholder Farmers' Perception 
of Risks in the Eastern Highlands of Ethiopia. Mimeograph 
102| P a g e  
 
Bembridge TJ (1988) Considerations for successful irrigation schemes in developing 
areas. Ciskei Agric. J. 8 15-20. 
Bembridge, T.J. and Williams,L.T.J (1990). Factors affecting the adoption of  growing 
maize practices in small- scale farmer support programmes. Southafrican 
journal of agric. Extension,53- 61, Pretoria. 
Bembridge, T.J. (1991). Technology transfer in small- scale dry land  crop 
production: Future challenges. Development Southern Africa, 8: 479- 493. 
Benson, C. and Clay, E. (1998). The impact of draught on sub- Saharan African 
economies: a              preliminary examination. Technical paper 401, 
Washington, DC. World Bank. 
Besley, T. (1995). Property rights and investment incentives: theory and eveidence 
from Ghana. Journal of Political Economy, 103: 903- 937. 
Binswinger, H.P. (1980). Attitudes towards risk: Experimental measurement in rural 
India. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62, 395-407. 
Binswager, (1982). Risk aversion, collateral requirement and the markets for credit 
and insurance in rural areas, world bank, Washington D.C., studies in 
employment and rural development. No 79 
Binswinger, H.P. & Sillers, D.A. (1983). Risk aversion and credit constraints in 
farmers’ decision making. Journal of Development Studies 20, 5-21. 
Bocque’h, G. and Jacquet, F. (2010). The adoption of switch grass and Mischants by 
farmers: Impact of liquidity constraints and risk preferences. Energy policy, 
38:2598- 2607. 
Boelhje, M.D. and Lins, D.A. (1998). Risks and risk management in an industrialised 
agriculture. Agricultural Finance review; 58: 1-16. 
Botha, L., Hallatt, J. and van Schalkwyk, H.D. (2004). The macro-economic 
environment  and the agricultural sector – Chapter 7. In Groenewald, J.A. 
103| P a g e  
 
(Ed). South African agricultural sector review – Evaluation of change since 
1994. National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria 
Bourque, L. and Fielder, E.F. (2002). How to conduct self administered and mail 
surveys. Volume 3 (3). 
 Bullock,W.I., Ortman , G.F. and Levin, J.B. (1994). Farmer characteristics, risk 
sources and managerial responses to risk in vegetable farming: Evidence 
from large- and small- scale commercial farmers in KwaZulu Natal. Agrekon, 
33: 103- 112. 
Caerteling, J.S., Di Benedetto, C.A., Doree, A.G., Halman, J.I.M., and Song, M. 
(2011). Technology edevelopment projects in road infrastructure; the 
relevance of government championing behaviour. Technovation, 31: 270- 
283. 
Caswell, J.A., Fulgie, K.O., Ingram, C.,Jan, S. and Kascak, C. (2001). Adoption of 
agricultural production practices: lessons learned from the US Department of 
Agriculture Area Studies Project. E.R.S: USDA. 
Chavas, J.P. and Holt M.T.,1990. Acreage decision under risk: the case of corn and 
soya bean. Oxford university press. 
Chavas, J. P., and M. T. Holt. 1996. “Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty: A Joint 
Analysiscof Risk Preferences and Technology.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 78:329-335 
Cotula, L. (2006). Key concepts and trends in policy and legislation. In Cotula (ed.), 
Land and water rights in the Sahel. Issue Paper No. 139, International 
Institute for environmental and Development, London. 
Cox, Sadiraj (2006): Small- and large stakes risk aversion – Implications of concavity 
calibration for decision theory In: Games and Economic Behaviour, pp. 45-60. 
 
 
Crosby C.T., De Lange M., Stimie C.M. and Van der Stoep I. (2000). A Review of 
Planning and Design Procedures Applicable to Small-Scale Farmer Irrigation 
104| P a g e  
 
Projects. WRC Report No. 578/2/00. Water Research Commission, Pretoria, 
South Africa. 240 pp. 
Dadi, L. Burton, M. and Ozanne, A. (2004). Duration analysis of technological 
adoption in Ethopian agriculture. Journal of Agriculture economics, 55: 613- 
631. 
Delgado, C.L. (1995). Agricultural Diversification and Export Promotion in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Food Policy, 20(3): 225-243. 
Delgado, C., M. Rosegrant, H. Steinfeld, S. Ehui, and C. Courbois. (1999). Livestock 
to 2020: The next food revolution. Food, Agriculture, and the Environment 
Discussion Paper 28. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), (2010). Estimate of the 
contribution of the agriculture sector to employment in the South African 
economy; Compiled by: Directorate: Economic Services Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
Dercon, S. (1996). Risk, Crop Choice, and Savings: Evidence from Tanzania," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, 
vol. 44(3), pages 485-513, April. 
Dercon, S. (2002). Income risk, coping strategies, and safety nets. World Bank 
Research Observer, 17: 141-166. 
Dercon, S. (2007). Fate and Fear: risk and its consenquences in Africa. Journal of 
African economies, 17:97- 127.  
De Weerdt, J. and Dercon, S. (2006). Risk sharing networks and insurance against 
illness. Journal of Development Economics, 81:337-356. 
Dillon, J.L. & Scandizzo, P.L. (1978). Risk attitudes of subsistence farmers in North 
East Brazil: A sampling approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics , 425-
434. 
105| P a g e  
 
Doss, C. and Michael M. (2001). “How Does Gender Affect the Adoption of 
Agricultural technologies? The case of improved maize technology in Ghana”. 
Agricultural economics 25:27. 
 
Du Plessis F.J., Van Averbeke W. and Van der Stoep I. (2002) Micro-Irrigation for 
Smallholders: Guidelines for Funders, Planners, Designers and Support Staff 
in South Africa. WRC Report No. TT 164/01. Water Research Commission, 
Pretoria, South Africa. 67 pp. 
Essa, J.A. and Niewuldt, W.L. (2001). Determinants of hybrid maize seed fertilizer 
adoption by emerging farmers in communal areas of KwaZulu Natal. Agrekon, 
40: 534-  548. 
Eisenhauerm,  R.G (2006).The Fate of Translation Vol. 82. ISBN-10: 0820463434 | 
 
Eswaran, M. and Kotwal, A. (2002), "The Role of the Service Sector in the Process 
of Development", Journal of Development Economics, (forthcoming). 
 
FAO. (2010). State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010 - Addressing food insecurity 
in protracted crises. FAO, Rome. 
Fafchamps, M. (1999). Rural poverty, risk, and development. Social development 
paper No 144. Rome: FAO.  
Flaten, O., Lien, G., Koeslig, M., Valle, P.S. and Ebbesvik, M.( 2005). Comparing risk 
perception and risk management in organic and conventional dairy farming: 
empirical results from Norway. Livestock production science, 95:11- 25. 
Ferrer, S.R.D., Hoag, D.L. & Nieuwoudt, W.L. (1997). Risk Preferences Of 
Kwazulu-Natal Commercial Sugarcane Farmers. Unpublished Paper. 
Department Of Agricultural Economics, University Of Natal. 
Gebre-Ab, N (2006). Commercialization of smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute, Notes and Papers Series No. 3. 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
106| P a g e  
 
Gomez-Limon, J. A., Arriaza, M., and Riesgo, L. 2003, "An MCDM analysis of 
agricultural risk aversion", European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 
151, no. 3, pp. 569-585. 
Govereh J, Jayne TS, Nyoro J (1999). Smallholder commercialization, interlinked 
markets and food crop productivity: Cross-country evidence in eastern and 
southern Africa. http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/ag_transformation/atw_govereh 
Glover, D.M. (1994). A Drosophila melanogaster homolog of the TIS11 family of 
immediate early genes that can rescue a cdr1 cdc25 mutant strain of fission 
yeast. Gene 151(1-2): 243--246 
Guillamont. P, Jeanneney, S. G., and Brun, J. f. (1999). How instability lowers 
African growth. Journal of African economies, 8: 87-107. 
Grebelissa, S. and Sharp, K. (2008). Commercialisation of  smallholder agriculture  
in selected Tef- growing areas of Ethopia. Ethiopian Economic Policy 
Research Institute (EEPRI), Addis Ababa. 
Hagos, F. and Holden, S. (2006). Tenure security, resource poverty, public 
programs, and household plot- level conservation investments in the 
highlands of Northen Ethopia, Agricultural Economics, 34: 183- 196. 
Hardaker, J.B., Huirne, R.B.M. and Anderson, J.R. (1997). Coping With Risk in 
Agriculture. CAB International, Wallingford, UK.274pp. 
Hardman, P.A., Darroch, M.A.G. and Ortman G.F. (2002). Improving cooperation to 
make the South African fresh apple export value chain more competitive. 
Journal on chain and network sciences,2: 61- 72. 
Harwood, J.R. (1999). Managing risks in farming: Concepts, Research and Analysis. 
Economic Research Services USDA. 
Hayes, J., Roth, M and Zepeda, L. (1997). Tenure security, investment and 
productivity in Gambian agriculture: a generalized probit analysis, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79: 369- 382. 
107| P a g e  
 
Hazell, P. and E. Lutz (1999). Integrating environmental and sustainability concerns 
into rural development policies . In Agriculture and Sustainable Rural 
Development, E. Lutz (ed.), The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 Hendrick, J and Mc Elreath, R. (2002). Are peasants risk- averse decision makers? 
Current Anthropolgy; 63:57- 64 
Hogson, S. (2004). Land and Water The Rights Interface. FAO Publication, Rome. 
Hollaway, G., Shankar, B and Rahman, S. (2002). Land redistribution. Tenure 
insecurity, and intensity of production: a study of farm households in southern 
Ethopia. Land Economics, 27: 383- 590. 
Holt, C.A and Laury, K.L (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. The American 
review. Vol. 92, no.5.ISBN 1644- 1655 
Huffman, W. and Evenson, R. (1993). Science for agriculture: A longterm 
Perspective. Oxford. Blackwell Publishing. 
IFAD (2008). Managing weather risk for agricultural development and disaster risk 
reduction. [Online]. www.ifad.org/ruralfinance/wrmf. Accesed August 20, 
2012. 
Iqbal S.M.M., Ireland C.R., Rodrigo V.H.L. (2005). Ecophysiological limitations to the 
productivity of tea in the rubber-tea intercropping systems. In: Preprints of the 
International Natural Rubber Conference. Cochin, India, pp.152-154. [ Links ] 
Kandel, S. and Stambaugh, R. F. (1991), “Expectations and Volatility of 
Consumption and Asset Returns,” Review of Financial Studies, 3, 207–232. 
 
Kachelmeier, S. J., and Mohamed S. (1992). Examining Risk Preferences under 
High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s Republic of 
China. American Economic Review 82(5), 1120-1141. 
Kisaka-Lwayo, M., and Obi, A., 2012, ―Risk Perception and Management 
Strategies by Small Holder Farmers in Kwazulu-Natal Provice, South Africa‖, 
International Management Association and institute of Agricultural 
108| P a g e  
 
Management, ISSN 2047-3710, International Journal of Agricultural 
Management, Volume 1 Issue 3. 
Kirsten, J. and Jerkins, L. (2003).BT cotton: adoption and farm incomesamongst 
small scale and larg scale farmers, ISSN 03031853, Agrecon. Volume 42. 
Khanna, M. (2001). Sequential adoption of site- specific technologies and its 
implications for nitrogen productivity: a double selectivity model. American 
journal of Agricultural Economics, 83:35 – 51. 
Kebede, Y. (1992). Risk behaviour and new agricultural technologies. The case 
study of producers in the Central highlands of Ethopia. Quartely Journal Of 
International Agriculture, 31:269- 284. 
Key, N., Elisabeth S., and de Janvry A. (2000). “Transactions costs and agricultural 
household supply response”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
82(2): 245-259. 
Kinsey, B. Burger M.K. and Gunning, J. (1998). Coping with drought in Zimbabwe: 
Survey evidence on responses of rural households to risk. World 
Development, 26: 89- 110. 
Kirsten, J., Vink, N. and Van Zyl, J. (1998). The agricultural democratisation of South 
Africa. Cape Town: AIPA/Francolin Publishers. 
Kirsten, J., Perret, s. & de Lange, A., undated. Rural Development: focussing on 
small scale agriculture in southern Africa. University of Pretoria, Pretoria 
Knight, J. , S. Weir and T. Woldehanna (2003) ‘The Role of Education in Facilitating 
Risk-Taking and Innovation in Agriculture’, Journal of Development Studies 
39.6: 1−22. 
Kocherlakota, N.R., (1998). "Money Is Memory,"Journal of Economic Theory, 
Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August. Minneapolis. 
Kodua-Agyekum C., 2009, ―The transfer of technology to the rural poor: The case 
of Qamata Irrigation Scheme in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa‖. 
109| P a g e  
 
Phd Thesis, Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, 
University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Kydd, J. G., A. R. Dorward,Morrison, J. and Cadisch, G.  (2001). New institutional 
economics, agricultural parastatals and marketing policy. In (eds) D. Byerlee 
and I. Livingstone, Renewing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: policy, 
performance and prospects, Routledge. 
   
Kydd, J. and Dorward, A. (2001) "The New Washington Consensus on Poor Country 
Agriculture: Analysis, Prescription and Gaps: with particular attention to 
globalisation and finance for seasonal inputs." Development Policy Review 
19(4): 467 – 478. 
Langyintuo, A. S. and Lowenberg- De Boer, J. (2006). Potential regional trade 
implications of adopting Bt cow- pea in West and Central Africa. The journal of 
Agro biotechnology management and economics, 9: 111- 120. 
Langyituo, A.S.and Mungoma, C. (2008). The effect of  household wealth on the 
adoption of improved maize varieties in Zambia. Food Policy, 33: 550- 559. 
Langyituo, A.S. and Mekuria, A. (2005). “ Accounting for neighbourhood influence in 
estimating factors determining the adoption of improved agricultural 
technologies”. Selected paper presented at the American Agricultural 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Providence, RI, USA, July 24- 27. 
Leedy, P. & Ormrod, J. (2001). Practical research: Planning and design (7th ed.). 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall. Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications.  
Lins, D.A., Gabriel S.C. and Sonka, S.T.,(1981). An analysis f risk aversion of farm 
operators: an asset portfolio approach. Western jounal of agricultural 
economics. Volume 6. 
Livingston, G, Schonberger, S. and Delaney, S. (2002) Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
state of smallholders in agriculture. International Fund for Agricultural 
Development Via Paolo Di Dono, 44, Rome 00142, Italy 
110| P a g e  
 
Lombard, J.P. and Kassier, W.E. (1990). Implementing the interval approach 
measuring risk attitudes of decision makers. Agrekon, 29: 290- 295  
Lubwana, F.B. (1999). Socio- economic and gender issues affecting the adoption of 
conservation tillage practices. In Khaubumbutho, P.G. and Simalinga, 
T.E.(eds): Traction Network foe Eastern and Southern Africa. Harare 
Zimbabwe. 
Machethe C,( 2005). The Status of Agricultural and Rural Finance in Southern Africa. 
Centre for Inclusive Banking in Africa for FinMark Trust (Final Draft) Online: 
Machina J. (1982). Expected utility analysis without the independence axiom. 
Econometrica. Volume 50. 
Makhura, M.T. (2001). Overcoming Transaction Costs Barriers to Market 
Participation of Smallholder Farmers in the Northern Province of South Africa. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. 
 
Malmendier, U. and Nagel, S. (2011). ‘Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic 
Experiences Affect Risk-Taking?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1): 
373-416.  
May, J. and Carter, M.R. (2009). “The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
(KIDS) 3rd wave: Methods, first findings and an agenda for future research,” 
Development Southern Africa 24(5):629-648. 
 
May, J. (ed) (1998). ‘Poverty and Inequality in South Africa’. Report prepared for the 
Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee 
for Poverty and Inequality. Durban: Praxis Publishing. 
 
May, J. and Woolard, I. (1997): The Nature and Measurement of Poverty, Inequality 
and Human Development in South Africa. Input paper prepared for the PIR, 
Universities of Natal and Port Elizabeth. 
 
Menezes C.F. and Hanson D.L. (1970). On the theory of risk aversion, international 
economic review. 
111| P a g e  
 
Mering, J.A. and Oosthuizen, L.K. (1993). Measuring irrigation farmers’ absolute risk- 
aversion coeffecients by means of the interval approach: the implications of 
scale adjustments. Agrekon, 32: 60- 73 
Meuwissen, M.P.M., Huirne, R.B.M. and Hardaker J.B. (2001). Risk and risk 
management : an empirical analysis of Dutch livestock farmers. Livestock 
Production Science, 69:43-53. 
Morduch, J. (1999), the Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 
1569- 1614. 
Moser, C. M. & Barrett, C. B., (2003). The complex dynamics of smallholder 
technology adoption: the complex od Sri in Madagascar, working papers  
Nieuwoudt, W.L & Hoag D.L. (1993). Standardizing Arrow-Pratt absolute risk 
aversion to the range and scale of the data. Unpublished paper, University of 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 
 
Noell, C. and M, Odening. (1997). Changes in Risk Management Over Time: The 
Impact of Learning and Changing Risk Preference. In: Huirne, R.B.M, J.B. 
Hardaker and A.A. Dijkhuizen (eds.) (1997). 
 
Ngqangweni, S.S. (2000). Promoting Income and Employment Growth in the Rural 
Economy  of the Eastern Cape through Smallholder Agriculture. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis. Pretoria: University of Pretoria 
 
Obi, A. and P. Pote. (2012). “Technical constraints to market access for crop and  
livestock farmers in Nkonkobe Municipality, Eastern Cape Province”, in H. D. 
van Schalkwyk, J.A. Groenewald, G.C.G. Fraser, A. Obi and A. van Tilburg 
(eds), Unlocking markets for smallholders – lessons from South Africa, 
Wageningen, Wageningen Academic Publishers and Mansholt Publications 
Series – Volume 10. 
 
Ortmann, G.F. and King, R.P., (2010).―Research on Agri-Food Supply Chain in 
Southern Africa Involving Small Scale Farmers: Current Status and Future 
112| P a g e  
 
Possibilities‖. Agrekon; vol 49 No. 4 December/December 2010: ISSN prints 
0303-1853/online 2078-0400 pg (399). 
Osotomehin, K. O. (1996). Accounting for farmers attitudes towards risk in the 
application of improved farm technologies: the case of inorganic fertilizer use 
in Oyo North Area of Oyo. State, Nigeria. Journal of Agriculture, 18:101- 111. 
Panelle,D.J., Marshal, G.R., Barr, N., Curtis, A., Vanclay, F. and Wilkinson, R. 
(2006). Understanding and promoting adoption of conservation technologies 
by rural landholders. Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture, 46: 1407- 
1424. 
Peter L, 2001. "Poverty, education, and health in Indonesia : who benefits from 
public spending?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2739, The World 
Bank. 
Pingali LP, Rosegrant MW (1995). Agricultural commercialization and diversification: 
Process and polices. Food Policy, 20(3): 171–185. Polson RA, Spencer DSC 
(1992). “The Technology Adoption Process in Subsistence Agriculture: The 
Case of Cassava in Southwestern Nigeria.” Agric. Syst., 36: 65-78. 
Pingali P (1997). From subsistence to commercial production System: The 
transformation of Asian agriculture. Am. J. Agric. Econ., 79(2): 628–634. 
Pingali, P.L., and Khwaja Y.(2004). “Globalisation of Indian Diets and the 
Transformation of Food Supply Systems.” Working Paper No. 04-05, 
Agricultural and Development Economics Division, Food and Agriculture 
Organization. 
Phiri, D., Franzel, S., Mafongoya, P., Jere, I., Katanga, R and Phiri, S. (2004). Who 
is using the new technology? The association of wealth status and gender 
with the planting of improved tree fallows in the Eastern Province, Zambia. 
Agricultural Systems, 79: 131- 144. 
113| P a g e  
 
Place, F. (2009). Land tenure and agricultural productivity in Africa: a comparative 
analysis of economic theory, empirical results, and policy statements. World 
Development, 37: 1326- 1336. 
Platteau, J.P., 1996. "Traditional Sharing Norms as an Obstacle to Economic Growth 
in Tribal Societies," Papers 173, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences 
Economiques et Sociales 
Pope R.D. and Just, R.E. 1991. “Production Function Estimation and related Risk 
Considerations.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61:67-86. 
 
Postlewaite, A.,(2011). ‘Social Norms and Preferences’, Chapter 2, Handbook for 
Social Economics, edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin and M. Jackson, Vol. 1, 
Elsevier 
Pradhan K, Dewina R, Minsten B (2010). Agricultural Commercialization and 
Diversification in Bhutan.IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), 
Washington, DC, USA. 
Pratt, J. (1964). “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large” Econometrica, 32: 
132-136. 
Rabin, M. (2000). "Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion," in 
Choices Values, and FramesD. Kahneman and A. Tversky, eds. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-08. 
Rabin, M. (2000). "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration 
Theorem." Econometrica. September, 68:5, pp. 1281-1292. 
 
Rabin, M. and Thaler R. (2001), ”Anomalies: Risk Aversion”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, 219-232 
Renkow, M., Daniel G. H, and Daniel D. K.. (2004). “Rural Infrastructure, 
Transactions Costs and Market Participation in Kenya.” Journal of 
Development Economics 73(1): 349-367. 
114| P a g e  
 
Reinders, F.B., Van der Stoep I., Lecler N.L., Greaves K.R., Vahrmeijer J.T., Benadé 
N., Du Plessis F.J., Van heerden P.S., Steyn J.M., Grové B., Jumman A. and 
AScough G. (2010) Standards and Guidelines for Improved Efficiency of 
Irrigation Water Use from Dam Wall Release to Root Zone Application: 
Guidelines. WRC Report No. TT 466/10. Water Research Commission, 
Pretoria, South Africa. 209 pp. 
 
Robinson, D. and Hanson, E. (1997). The successful cranberry production. Lansing, 
MI: Horticultural branch of the Michigan Department of Agriculture. 
 
Robinson, L. and Barry, P.: (1987). The Competitive Firm's Response to Risk, 
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York. 
 
Rogers, E.M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations, 5th edition. Free Press, New York. 
Rosenberg, N.J. (1992). Adaptation of agriculture to climate change. Climate 
change, 21: 385- 405. 
Ross, S. (1981): Some stronger measures of risk aversion in the small and large with 
applications, econometrica,489,621-638 
Salmonu, K.K., and Falusi, A.O. (2009). Sources of risk and management strategies 
among food crop farmers in Osun state, Nigeria. African journal of food, 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Development, 9:7-16. 
Sanders, J.H., Shapiro, B.I. snd Ramaswamy, S. (1996). The economics of 
agricultural technology in sub- Saharan Africa. John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore. 
Scarry, C.M. (1993). Agricultural risk and development of th Moundeville ciefdom. In 
Scarry C.M. (Ed): foraging and farming in the eastern Woodlands. University 
Press Florida, Gainesville. 
115| P a g e  
 
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (2003). “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, 
Evidence and Limitations,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 20, June 
1982, pp. 529-563. 
Shackleton, S.E., Shackleton, C.M. and Cousins, B. (2000) ‘The economic value of 
land and natural resources to rural livelihoods: case studies from South 
Africa’. pp.35- 67 In: Cousins, B. (ed.) (2000). 
Shapiro, B. I., Sanders, J.H., Reddy, K.C. and Baker, T.G. (1993). Evaluating and 
adapting new technologies in a high risk agricultural system in Niger. 
Agricultural systems, 42: 153- 171. 
Shaw, K., 91996). ‘An Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion and Income Growth,’ 
Journal of Labor Economics, 14(4): 626-653. 
 
Smith, V.L. and James M. W,(1993) "Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in 
Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry, 31, 245-261. 
Stockil, R.C. and Ortman, G.F. (1997). Perception of risk among commercial farmers 
in KaZulu Natal in a changing economic environment. Agrekon, 36:139- 156. 
Stroebel, A. (2004). Socio- Economic complexities of smallholder resource- poor 
ruminant livestock production systems in sub- Saharan Africa. Thesis 
Dissertation. University of Free State. 
Swanepoel V & Ortmann GF (1993). Sources and management of risk in extensive 
livestock farming in the North-Western Transvaal Bushveld. Agrekon 
32(4):196-200. 
Timmer C.P. (1997). Farmers and markets: The political economy of new paradigms. 
Am. J. Agric. Econ., 79(2): 621–627. 
Tomek, W. and Hikaru, H (2001). Risk management in agricultural markets. A 
review. The jounal of failures markets, 21: 953- 985 
116| P a g e  
 
Tucker, M. and Napier T.L.(2001). Determinants of perceived agricultural chemical 
risk in three watersheds in the Midwestern United States. Journal of Rural 
Studies 2001, Volume 17, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 219-233 
United States Department of Agriculture, USDA (2000). Risk management 
strategies. 
http://www.ma.usda.gov/aboutrma/what00-05 stratplan.pdf. Accessed 25 February 
2012 
Van Rooyen, C.J., Vink, N and Chrisodoulou, N.T. (1987). Access to the agricultural 
market for small farmers in Southern Africa: The agricultural support 
programme Development Southern Africa. Vol 4 No 2:207- 223 
Van Averbeke W, J Denison, and Mnkeni P.N.S. (2011).―Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes in South Africa: A review of Knowledge Generated by the Water 
Research Commission‖, Centre for Organic and Smallholder Agriculture, 
website http://www.wrc.org.za; ISSN 0378-4738, Water SA, Vol. 37 No. 5 
WRC.  
Van Zyl, M. (1995). Prediction of survival hospitalised cacine babeniosis. MMed Vet 
dissertation. Faculty of veterinary science. University of Pretoria 
Van Rooyen C.J., (1997). Access to the agricultural market for small farmers in 
Southern Africa: The agricultural support programme Development Southern 
Africa. Vol 4 No 2:207- 223.  
Van Schalkwyk H.D., Botha L., & Hallatt J. (2004). The macro-economic 
environment and the agricultural sector - Chapter 7. In Groenewald, J.A. (Ed). 
South African agricultural sector review - Evaluation of changes since 1994. 
National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria 
Von Braun J, Bouis H, Kennedy E (1994). Conceptual framework. In: von Braun J 
and Kennedy E (eds), Agricultural commercialization, economic development, 
and nutrition. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, USA. pp. 
9–33. 
117| P a g e  
 
Von Neumann J. and Morgenstern O. (1944). Theory of games and economic 
behaviour. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
Wilson P.N., Dalhgran, R.D. and Conklin N.C. (1993). Perceptions as reality on 
large- scale dairy farms. Review of Agriculture Economics, 15:89- 101. 
Woodburn, M.R., Ortman, G.F. and Levin, J.B. (1995). Sources and management of 
risk: Evidence from commercial farmers in KwaZulu-Natal. South African 
journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 17:46- 63. 
World Bank (2005). Managing agricultural production risk: innovations in developing 
countries. Report No. 3272- GLB. Washington DC: World Bank 
World Bank (2001). World development report 2000/20001: Attacking poverty. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Yesuf, M., and R. Bluffstone (2007). Risk Aversion in Low-Income Countries: 
Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia, IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 715 
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.. 
Zalweski, R. I. and Skawi_ Ska. E. (2006). Food safety of; Commodity science point 
of view. Poster paper prepared for presentation at the international 
Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, 
August 12- 18. 
Zimmerman, F. and Carter, M. (2003) ‘Asset Smoothing, Consumption Smoothing 
and the Reproduction of Inequality Under Risk and Subsistence Constraints,’ 
Journal of Development Economics 71.2, August: 233–60. 
 
 
118| P a g e  
 
APPENDIX  
Appendix I- Questionnaire 
 
UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE, 
 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
 
Risk preferences of smallholder irrigation farmers in the former Ciskei Homelands of the Eastern Cape, South Africa 
Questionnaire number                       Name of Interviewer         Local Municipality  
 
Village      Smallholder irrigation farmer              Homestead food gardener   
A.HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION  
Position in the household Head  Spouse  Child  Child  Other  Other  Other Other  Other  
1. Gender  M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
F 
2. Age in years          
3. Highest level of 
education 
1-No formal Education 
2-Primary 
3-Secondary 
4-Tertiary 
5-Others 
         
4. Occupation           
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1-Retired 
2-Unemployed 
3- Farmer 
4- Employee 
5- Self employed 
6- School/ pre-school 
5. Salary income (R / 
mon) 
         
B. LAND USE AND ACCESS 
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6.  Type of plot 
1-Homestead (Water 
source – e.g. tap at 
home, 
communal tap, 
borehole 
spring etc) 
2-Irrigated land (fields) 
(Water source, 
reliability, 
quantity, timing) 
3-Dry land 
Size and 
number 
(Hectares, 
acres, 
square meters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tenure system 
1-Own  
2-(communal) 
3-Lease 
4-Other (Specify) 
Time 
(yrs) for 
which 
tenure 
has been 
held? 
Fees(R) 
(For water, for land. 
Specify how much and to 
whom) 
 
 
 
Ploughing 
Method 
1-Own 
tractor 
(specify 
whether hire 
it out, price, 
average 
income) 
2-Hire 
tractor, price, 
3-Hand tools 
4-Employ 
labour 
(specify 
times, 
number of 
people 
and rates) 
 
 
 
water 
(R) 
land 
(R) 
Price 
(R) 
 
 
To who 
 
 
 
Price 
(R) 
 
To who 
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C. PRODUCTION INFORMATION 
7. Fill in the following information on production  
Crop name  
 
Area 
Planted 
(ha, 
square 
metres, 
acres…..) 
 
Quantity 
harvested 
(Specify unit; 
tons, kg, 
bags  
 
Unit 
price 
 
(Selling 
price) 
(R) 
Quantity sold 
(specify unit 
e.g. kgs.bags, 
packets) 
Quantity 
1.consumed 
2.bartered  
3.donated 
specify 
which 
(specify unit 
e.g. kgs.bags, 
packets) 
Market outlet 
1-local 
2-shop 
3-neighbours 
4-hawkers, 
5-contractor, 
6-other 
 
Season 
 Planted 
1-
Summer 
2-Autumn 
3-winter 
4-spring 
Times  
Planted a 
year 
1-Maize         
2-Spinach         
3-Carrots         
4-Cabbage         
5-Tomatoes         
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6-Potatoes         
7- Other 
(Specify) 
        
 
D.  IRRIGATION AND SOURCES OF WATER (Please tick the appropriate answer) 
8. Are you are member of an irrigation scheme? Yes                            No 
9. Where do you obtain water for irrigation? a. Dam              b. River                c. Borehole         d. taps    
                                                                         e. harvested water          f. Individual tanks           g. other Specify-----------------------  
10. Do you pay for water? a. Yes   b. No   
 
11. If yes, how much(R) is the rate? 
 
12. Which type of irrigation system do you use? a. Sprinkler                        b. Drip irrigation                      c. Furrowing 
irrigation                      
 
                                                                              d. Pivot                               e. Others (specify) 
E. FINANCIALS 
13.  Credit and cash loans 
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A. Amount of cash 
Borrowed/ credit used 
Tick  Main purpose of the 
loan/ credit 
Tick Source of Credit Tick Financial Security Tick 
1.Less than R5000  1.Family support  1.Bank  1.Insurance  
2.R 5001- R10 000  2.Education of 
Children 
 2.Lender   2.Other (Specify)  
3.R10 001- R15 000  3.Inputs  3.Governmantal 
Institutions  
   
4.R15 001- R20 000  4.Other (specify)  4. Other (Specify)    
5.R20 001- R25 000        
 
F. RISK 
14. Rank the following sources of risk from 1 to 3 where 1 is no problem and 3 is a severe problem (tick where appropriate)  
Constraint  1 No  
problem 
2 
minor 
3 
severe 
Constraint  1 No 
problem 
2  
minor 
3  
severe 
1. Livestock damage crops    9. Inputs not available at affordable 
prices 
   
2. Uncertain climate (e.g. 
draught) 
   10. Tractor is not available    
3. Uncertain prices for 
products sold to markets 
   11. Cannot find labour to hire    
4. More work than the family 
can handle 
   12.Cannot access more crop land    
5. Lack of cash and credit to    13.Delays in payment for products     
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15. Compared to other household decision makers in the area, are you more likely, less likely or equally likely to take risks? 
a. More likely                                b.  Less likely                c. equally likely 
16. If a new farming technology (e.g. a new variety of seeds) were available, compared to other farmers in this area, would you be: 
a. Early adopter                  b. Would you wait and see attitude                
17. The table below lists the six choices, each gamble with an equal chance of realizing the lower or higher pay off. Indicate which 
of the six choices you would most prefer: A, B, C, D, E or F 
 
CHOICE 
 
PAYOFF1(RANDS) 
 
PAYOFF 2 (RANDS) 
       A 
 
100 100 
        B 
 
90 180 
        C 
 
80 240 
        D 
 
60 300 
        E 
 
20 380 
        F 
 
0 400 
finance inputs 
6. Lack of information about 
producing  crops 
   14. Lack of proper transport for 
products) 
   
7. Lack of information about 
alternative markets 
   15.Other (specify    
8. Lack of proper storage 
facilities 
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18.  If you are faced with an option to take a gamble or the option to receive a sure amount of money, which do you prefer?  
 
                                         Option 1: A coin is tossed:   TAIL: You win R380     HEAD: You win 20  
 
                                         Option 2   
 
R220 R200 R180 R160 R140 R120 R80 
 
  
19. Please consider the gambles below: which of the two gambles would you rather play? 
 
Option A Option B 
       50% chance to win R100 
       50% chance to lose R15 
      90% chance to win R100 
      10% chance to lose R10 
 
20. Please consider the options below: which one is more attractive? 
 
Option A Option B 
       Receive R250 today        Receive R300 in a week 
 
21. If you are faced with an option to take a gamble or the option to receive a sure amount of money, would you play this game?  
 
 
 
Heads  Tails  Yes  No  
Loose R50 Win R 100   
Loose R60 Win R 100   
Loose R70 Win R 100   
Loose R80 Win R 100   
Loose R90 Win R 100   
Loose R100 Win R 100   
Loose R150 Win R 100   
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